Invoking Naturalistic and Religious Attributions: A Case of Applying the Availability Heuristic? The Representativeness Heuristic?

Lupfer, Michael B.; Layman, Elizabeth J.

doi:10.1521/soco.1996.14.1.55

Cited by 21 publications

(41 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…On the one hand, the promoters of the representativeness heuristic have identified a range of situations where biases predicted by the heuristic appears (e.g. Davidson, 1995; Kahneman & Tversky, 1972, 1973; Lupfer & Layman, 1996; Teigen, Martinussen & Lund, 1996; Tversky & Kahneman, 1983) On the other hand, its skeptics have provided a range of situations where the same biases appear but when the heuristic can not be the cause (e.g. Gavanski & Roskos‐Ewoldsen, 1991; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exemplars in the mist: The cognitive substrate of the representativeness heuristic

Nilsson

Juslin

Olsson

2008

Scandinavian J Psychology

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The idea that people often make probability judgments by a heuristic short-cut, the representativeness heuristic, has been widely influential, but also criticized for being vague. The empirical trademark of the heuristic is characteristic deviations between normative probabilities and judgments (e.g., the conjunction fallacy, base-rate neglect). In this article the authors contrast two hypotheses concerning the cognitive substrate of the representativeness heuristic, the prototype hypothesis (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) and the exemplar hypothesis (Juslin & Persson, 2002), in a task especially designed to elicit representativeness effects. Computational modelling and an experiment reveal that representativeness effects are evident early in training and persist longer in a more complex task environment and that the data are best accounted for by a model implementing the exemplar hypothesis.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exemplars in the mist: The cognitive substrate of the representativeness heuristic

Nilsson

Juslin

Olsson

2008

Scandinavian J Psychology

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“…Furthermore, this hypothesis posits that as one of the explanatory schemas becomes more available, this decreases the likelihood that the other will be activated. However, research has begun to show that secular and religious attributions are not always used in this disjunctive, mutually exclusive manner (e.g., Lupfer, Brock, and DePaola 1992; Lupfer, DePaula, Brock, and Clement 1994;Lupfer and Layman 1996;Shortz and Worthington 1994). Thus, these two explanatory schemas might not represent multiple sufficient schemas (i.e., each system being sufficient to account for a given behavior or event by itself; Kelley 1972) for the explanation of events, as the Spilka group proposed, but rather, they might be used in conjunction with one another.Matthew Weeks is a graduate student at…”

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confidence: 99%

“…If so, this tendency could account for two recurrent findings in the religious attribution literature, which, as noted, has concentrated on proximal explanations. First, attributions to religious agents are infrequent, especially relative to secular attributions (e.g., Gorsuch and Smith 1983;Lupfer et al 1992;Lupfer and Layman 1996;Ritzema 1979;Ritzema and Young 1983;Spilka and Schmidt 1983). Though research has identified several factors that increase the use of religious attributions, the attributions to religious agents remain modest, at best.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Religious Attributions and Proximity of Influence: An Investigation of Direct Interventions and Distal Explanations

Weeks

Lupfer

2000

Scientific Study of Religion

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Investigations into religious attributions have focused on attributer's immediate, proximal causes of events, paying little attention to underlying, distal explanations. In an effort to explain the relatively low incidence of religious attributions and further a new model of proximal-distal attributions, we present two experiments investigating the proximal and distal use of religious and nonreligious supernatural attributions. Participants in both studies were presented a series of sixteen vignettes that varied on several attribution-relevant dimensions. After reading each vignette, subjects gave an initial explanation for the event, and were then probed for any underlying explanations. Experiment 1 used an interview format that allowed participants maximum latitude when explaining the event's outcome. Consistent with our predictions, participants perceived God as having a greater distal than proximal influence, though this difference was not evident for attributions to Satan or nonreligious supernatural agents. Experiment 2 was performed via a microcomputer, with a participant's initial attributional response branching to a set of appropriate distal explanations. Overall, the results suggest that attributer's perceive God working through indirect influences rather than direct intervention, with this effect being moderated by the attributer's level of religiosity. This pattern was evident in the use of God as a distal explanation as well as in the distal explanations to proximal attributions to God.As informal observation reveals, everyday explanations for events often include such phrases as "God's will," "the work of Satan," or even "the hand of God" (see Nelson 1997 for excellent examples). To account for these religious attributions, Spilka, Shaver, and Kirkpatrick (1985) suggested that those individuals who adhere to the tenets of conservative Christianity 1 have at their disposal two separate explanatory systems: 1) a set of naturalistic or secular schemas (e.g., protagonist's disposition, the situation) and 2) a set of religious schemas (e.g., God, Satan). Drawing upon the social cognition literature, Spilka and his colleagues suggested an "availability hypothesis" to determine which schemas would be used in explaining an event (Fiske and Taylor 1991). That is, the relative availability of the schemas would determine which set was initially used to explain an event, with the contention being that the naturalistic schema is usually the more salient, and thus, more available. To the extent the initial schema is inadequate in its explanation, however, the other is applied. Furthermore, this hypothesis posits that as one of the explanatory schemas becomes more available, this decreases the likelihood that the other will be activated. However, research has begun to show that secular and religious attributions are not always used in this disjunctive, mutually exclusive manner (e.g., Lupfer, Brock, and DePaola 1992; Lupfer, DePaula, Brock, and Clement 1994;Lupfer and Layman 1996;Shortz and Worthington 1994). Th...

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“…Compared to the daily life, people intended to attribute to God when facing with life-altering events (Lupfer, & Layman, 1996). Baker (2008) suggests that women and African Americans are more likely to attribute to hell, devil and Satan, and people with high education level and high income are less likely to attribute to these factors.…”

Section: Development Of Fate Attributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Attribution Theory of Confucianism and Its Function To Mental Health

Wang¹

2016

IOSR

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Abstract:-This paper explores the attribution theory of Confucianism, which consists of two aspects: first, faced with major life mishaps, such as sickness or death, Confucianism intends to attribute them to external factors of "Tianming", unstable, uncontrollable fate; second, meeting failures or frustrations in enterprise pursuits, they usually attribute them to internal, stable and controllable factors. Referring to the modern attribution theories, such views of attribution may have some positive role on people's enterprises and life. More studies are needed to examine the impacts the theory on people's psychology and behaviors.

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Invoking Naturalistic and Religious Attributions: A Case of Applying the Availability Heuristic? The Representativeness Heuristic?

Cited by 21 publications

References 2 publications

Exemplars in the mist: The cognitive substrate of the representativeness heuristic

Exemplars in the mist: The cognitive substrate of the representativeness heuristic

Religious Attributions and Proximity of Influence: An Investigation of Direct Interventions and Distal Explanations

The Attribution Theory of Confucianism and Its Function To Mental Health

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