Invitation to the Axiology of Theism

Kraay, Klaas J.

doi:10.4324/9781315210995-1

Cited by 10 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 1 publication

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The question is phrased, and answered, in more ways than I can do justice to here. (Notably, a recent collection, Kraay (2018), features eleven original essays on this topic.) The important thing to bear in mind for the present article, though, is that a key aspect of the axiological question is how God's existence would, or does, affect life's meaning (see, for example, the aforementioned Mawson ( 2016) for an extended pro-theistic answer to the axiological question vis-à-vis life's meaning).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What if God was all of us? Why the definition of ‘God’ matters in analytic discussions of meaning in life

Singh

2023

Rel. Stud.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Contemporary analytic treatments of meaning in life in the English-speaking Anglo-American-Australasian tradition have largely proceeded from the atheistic and naturalistic assumptions common to the sciences. With the recent publication of Seachris and Goetz's God and Meaning (2016), T. J. Mawson's God and the Meanings of Life (2016), and Thaddeus Metz's God, Soul and the Meaning of Life (2019), more analytic philosophers might be drawn to (re)examining what role, if any, God might play in life's meaning. But the focus tends to be on ‘God’ as understood in the Abrahamic faiths. Examining meaning in the light of another concept of God, familiar to billions of individuals in various Eastern religions and intellectual traditions, might offer useful insights. I have two principle aims in this article. First, I describe an ancient Indian concept of ‘God’, showing how it radically differs from the concept of God currently under examination by philosophers of meaning. Second, I offer a novel case for why and how this concept of ‘God’ could fruitfully contribute to analytic discussions on God's possible role in life's meaning.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What if God was all of us? Why the definition of ‘God’ matters in analytic discussions of meaning in life

Singh

2023

Rel. Stud.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…2 Although important themes from this discussion are anticipated in Rescher (1990), the contemporary literature on this topic begins with Kahane (2011). For surveys of most of the discussion to date, see Kraay (2018a) and Lougheed (2019). 3 This term is infelicitous for two reasons.…”

Section: Stage-settingmentioning

confidence: 98%

The Axiology of Theism

Kraay

2021

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Theism is the view that God exists; naturalism is the view that there are no supernatural beings, processes, mechanisms, or forces. This Element explores whether things are better, worse, or neither on theism relative to naturalism. It introduces readers to the central philosophical issues that bear on this question, and it distinguishes a wide range of ways it can be answered. It critically examines four views, three of which hold (in various ways) that things are better on theism than on naturalism, and one of which holds just the opposite.

show abstract

“…The question is intelligible, I believe, but is one we struggle to grasp, as the growing literature on this subject (cf. Kraay, 2018) reveals 30…”

Section: Atheism and Anti‐theism Incompatibilism And Anti‐compatibilismmentioning

confidence: 99%

It would be bad if compatibilism were true; therefore, it isn't

Todd

2023

Philosophical Issues

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

I want to suggest that it would be bad if compatibilism were true, and that this gives us good reason to think that it isn't. This is, you might think, an outlandish argument, and the considerable burden of this paper is to convince you otherwise. There are two key elements at stake in this argument. The first is that it would be ‐ in a distinctive sense to be explained ‐ bad if compatibilism were true. The thought here is that compatibilism ultimately presents us with a picture on which, in principle, powerful manipulators can effectively guarantee that finite moral agents should become blameworthy. To my mind, this isn't just false ‐ though I think that it is ‐ it is also such that it would be bad (unfortunate, undesirable…) if it were true. The second is that the fact that it would be ‐ in this sense ‐ bad if true gives us reason to think that it isn't. It may be bad that there is no afterlife. But that, in itself, hardly gives us reason to think that there is an afterlife. That is true, but ‐ as others before me have suggested ‐ when the object of the relevant badness is morality itself, the inference seems secure. A more general aim of the paper is to investigate the nature of this very form of argument in itself, and I compare my argument (inter alia) to a recent argument from Sayre–McCord against the possibility of genuine moral dilemmas.

show abstract

Invitation to the Axiology of Theism

Cited by 10 publications

References 1 publication

What if God was all of us? Why the definition of ‘God’ matters in analytic discussions of meaning in life

What if God was all of us? Why the definition of ‘God’ matters in analytic discussions of meaning in life

The Axiology of Theism

It would be bad if compatibilism were true; therefore, it isn't

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About