2011
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1755436
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Investment Objectives of Sovereign Wealth Funds - A Shifting Paradigm

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Cited by 19 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Except for Azerbaijan, no major changes in the magnitude of coefficient are found 5. The following literature is mainly used to identify stabilization funds: IMF(2008, 2010 and 2012b),Ossowski et al (2008), UNCTAD (2008),Truman (2009 and,Kojo (2010),Kunzel et al (2010),Sinnott et al (2010),Bagattini (2011) andBaunsgaard et al (2012). The list of stabilization funds included in this paper is in Appendix 2 6.…”
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confidence: 99%
“…Except for Azerbaijan, no major changes in the magnitude of coefficient are found 5. The following literature is mainly used to identify stabilization funds: IMF(2008, 2010 and 2012b),Ossowski et al (2008), UNCTAD (2008),Truman (2009 and,Kojo (2010),Kunzel et al (2010),Sinnott et al (2010),Bagattini (2011) andBaunsgaard et al (2012). The list of stabilization funds included in this paper is in Appendix 2 6.…”
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confidence: 99%
“…Long investment horizons would usually be associated with the ability to assume greater risk, where risk can involve the probability of a loss or underperformance with reference to other assets. Also, long investment horizons usually indicate the ability to invest in illiquid assets that provide the means to accrue the benefit of an illiquidity premium (Kunzel et al, 2011). This indicates that assets such as infrastructure, real estate and private equity may take a longer time to exit without adversely affecting the prices of these assets.…”
Section: Fig 14 Swf Types and Asset Allocations Source: Imf (2012)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In total, SWFs invested almost $90 billion in the stock of U.S. and European financial institutions between July 2005 and October 2008, and CIC injected an additional $40 billion into recapitalizing two Chinese state-owned banks in late 2007 and 2008. These funds have thus collectively invested more new capital into the world's financial institutions recently than any other single entity except the entire United States government.These episodes highlighted both the sheer financial firepower of SWFs and just how dependent on them western financial economies had become, and vice versa[Kunzel, Lu, Petrova, and Pihlman (2011);Bolton, Samama, and Stiglitz (2012)]. Early comments by public officials and analyses in the popular press tended to be very hostile towards SWFs, emphasizing perceived problems associated with their growth.…”
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confidence: 99%