1997
DOI: 10.1007/bf01226827
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Investment and technological choice in a right-to-manage model

Abstract: putty-clay technology, wage bargaining, union power, JEL classification, J51, D21,

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“…Hoel (1990) andFagnart and Germain (1997) consider models with (long-run) investments where the amount of capital has to be determined previous to wage-negotiations (right-to-manage model); andCripps (1997) analyses the equilibrium timing of investment decision and wage bargaining under uncertainty.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Hoel (1990) andFagnart and Germain (1997) consider models with (long-run) investments where the amount of capital has to be determined previous to wage-negotiations (right-to-manage model); andCripps (1997) analyses the equilibrium timing of investment decision and wage bargaining under uncertainty.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%