2017
DOI: 10.31235/osf.io/dsgrk
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Investigating the Difference in Policy Responses to the 2004 and 2005 Hurricane Seasons and Homeowner Insurance Crises in Florida and Louisiana

Abstract: In 2004 and 2005, a series of hurricanes caused record homeowner insurance losses in Florida and Louisiana. Despite comparably sized losses, the two states responded differently to these shocks. Florida expanded state subsidized homeowner insurance, breaking from a free market response, whereas Louisiana actively promoted private market supply. Comparing the two policy processes reveals that the politics and transformation of homeowner insurance evoked by extreme weather events depend on how concentrated the h… Show more

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Cited by 2 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Local officials worry about the viability of the tax base. In the US, this has set in motion a reactive politics around defending property investments, with coalitions of homeowners, real estate and construction interests, local officials, and chambers of commerce mobilizing to blunt the force of insurance-led devaluations of hazardous areas [Elliott 2017b; Weinkle and Pielke, Jr. 2017; Checker 2017; Ubert 2017]. Take the specific case of flood insurance, which is publicly provided through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and run by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).…”
Section: The Politics Of Lossmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Local officials worry about the viability of the tax base. In the US, this has set in motion a reactive politics around defending property investments, with coalitions of homeowners, real estate and construction interests, local officials, and chambers of commerce mobilizing to blunt the force of insurance-led devaluations of hazardous areas [Elliott 2017b; Weinkle and Pielke, Jr. 2017; Checker 2017; Ubert 2017]. Take the specific case of flood insurance, which is publicly provided through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and run by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).…”
Section: The Politics Of Lossmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It requires the Federal Emergency Management Agency, which administers the [NFIP], to subsidize premiums … Reform efforts in recent years have fallen short … The biggest change would be to have premiums reflect the actual overall risk. Previous attempts to quickly increase their cost over just a few years faltered after policyholders and their elected representatives pushed back (Editorial Board, ).As Hurricane Irma approached Florida, a sociologist in a Washington Post op‐ed expressed a similar sentiment:
Don't be surprised if, once again, Florida's homeowners are able to pressure their politicians into abandoning their support for private insurance markets, instead subsidizing hurricane risks” (Ubert ).
…”
Section: The Conventional Wisdommentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Don't be surprised if, once again, Florida's homeowners are able to pressure their politicians into abandoning their support for private insurance markets, instead subsidizing hurricane risks” (Ubert ).…”
Section: The Conventional Wisdommentioning
confidence: 99%