Investigating Emotions Philosophically¹

Abstract

How are emotions to be investigated philosophically? Among philosophers of emotion of the past decades you will find mainly two answers to this question. On the one hand, there are those who are committed to some form of conceptual analysis (e.g. ). (By "conceptual analysis" I mean investigations into the meanings of words by reflecting on their use.) On the other hand, there are those who think that conceptual analysis is short of empirical grounding and at best reflect current "common-sense beliefs." What should be of essence to us as philosophers, they think, is not how we currently conceptualise emotions, but how we conceptualise emotional phenomena themselves (e.g. DeLancy 2002;Griffiths 1997;Prinz 2004).This latter stance harks back to Quine's attack on the analytic/ synthetic distinction, his idea that all language is theory dependent and the subsequent critique of "linguistic philosophy" as sanctifying our ordinary use of words, as empirically naïve, unscientific and founded on outmoded theories of meaning (cf. Hacker 1996b).This paper is an attempt to show why this critique is misplaced. Conceptual analysis, properly construed, need not depend on empirical considerations. On the contrary, conceptual analysis of emotions is often a prerequisite to empirical investigations. Furthermore, conceptual analysis need not make ordinary language sacred and need not rely on a theory of meaning or on an analytic/synthetic distinction.The first part of the paper is a critique of Robert C. Roberts's recent "semi-empiricist" account of conceptual analysis. The second part attempts to show why "empiricists" got it the wrong way round 1. I want to thank Lars Hertzberg and John V.

Emotion, Meaning, and Appraisal Theory

“…This, dare I say, methodological uncertainty is arguably the reflection of at least two misconceptions. First, Parkinson does not seem to fully understand that reflecting on our use of words is integral to investigating their meanings, and that, with this in mind, it is not clear that empirical research is relevant (see McEachrane, 2006). What we need to do when investigating the meaning of a word is remind ourselves of how a word may be used in such and such context (e.g., a person telling a friend about his childhood that, "My summer times were joyous") and how such and such use may be understood in terms of its meaning (e.g., he could have been referring to the free time, the sunshine, the warm MCEACHRANE: EMOTION, MEANING, AND APPRAISAL THEORY weather, the outdoor life, the adventures) and implication (e.g., finding joy in warm weather need not be constituted by belief).…”

“…A straightforward answer to such questions is that scientific psychology should be concerned with the ordinary meanings of emotion terms because 36 THEORY & PSYCHOLOGY 19(1) any reference to emotional phenomena presupposes an understanding of what phenomena are to count as "joy," "fear," "anger," and so on-which, in turn, means paying heed to "joy," "fear," "anger," "sadness," and so on, as we ordinarily understand them (see McEachrane, 2006;Melden, 1969;Rorty, 1980, pp. 3-4).…”

“…In contrast to the empirical approach of contemporary appraisal theory my conclusion is that the questions that are central to it are about the meanings of words and are to be settled by reflecting on our use of words. Although I will not address the question whether or not such reflections in themselves are in need of empirical methods (see McEachrane, 2006), the conclusion is a radical break with current appraisal theory and a call for a more philosophical approach.…”