Invariance and Objectivity

Vollmer, Gerhard

doi:10.1007/s10701-010-9471-x

“…For these phenomena, representations can be assumed to be shaped towards truth, as objective representations are optimal. Although we never can be sure whether we have reached objectiveness (Vollmer, 2010), we can expect a convergence towards objectiveness. The paracosm, in contrast, denotes phenomena with asymmetric utility surfaces.…”

Section: Meta- Para- and Orthocosmmentioning

confidence: 90%

“…But it would not pay to aim at or to reach perfection." (Vollmer, 2010(Vollmer, , p. 1652. 13 The term "evolutionary epistemology" has been used in at least two different notions (Bradie, 1986).…”

Section: Evolutionary Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Both Vollmer and Bischof agree that additional sensors can increase the objectivity of a representation. If multiple methods of measurement converge on the same result this would be a sign of measurement invariance (Bischof, 1966;Vollmer, 2010).…”

Section: Increasing Objectivity: Multidimensional Utility Surfaces Anmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For Vollmer (2010), measurement invariance actually is the defining criterion for objectivity: "A proposition is objective if and only if its meaning and its truth is invariant against a change in the conditions under which it was formulated, that is, if it is independent of its author, observer, reference system, test method, and conventions" (p. 1658).…”

Section: /32mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Hence, probing the colour perception of our monkeys with additional devices, independent of any toxicity associations, can be the tool to assess the objectivity of a representation (Vollmer, 2010). Although we never can be sure whether we have reached objectivity, invariance is the touchstone that tests for objectivity.…”

Section: /32mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

When misrepresentation is successful

Zehetleitner¹,

Schönbrodt²

2016

Preprint

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In the present chapter, we investigate the notion that an action is successful if and only if (iff) it is caused by a true representation. We demonstrate that there indeed exist representations which -even though being false -can systematically lead to successful actions, if specific conditions hold, especially, if there is stochastic noise in the generation of representations and the cost of errors is asymmetrically distributed and the success-relevant feature can only be indirectly assessed via indicator features. Finally, we discuss this observation in relation to illusionary perception and evolutionary epistemology.Keywords: Semantics, success semantics, evolutionary epistemology, teleosemantics, decision theory Final Draft. To appear in: Breyer, T. (2013). Epistemological Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology. New York: Springer. 3/32 When misrepresentation is successfulHow can a representation lead to a successful action? It is widely taken for granted that a representation has to be true in order to be successful (e.g., Shea, 2007;Millikan, 1989; Whyte, 1990;Ramsey & Moore, 1927;Blackburn, 2005). Consider for instance, how could a person successfully sit down on or avoid a chair, unless she has a true visual representation of the chair"s shape and position? Or, to make use of an example of Ramsey in Ramsey and Moore (1927): How can the belief of a chicken, that a certain caterpillar is toxic be useful, unless the caterpillars are actually toxic? It even has been proposed, that "(t)ruth just is the property of a belief that suffices for your getting what you want when you act upon it." (Whyte, 1990, p. 149).Although this notion of truth being a prerequisite for success has a high face validity, we shall argue that it is wrong to suppose that all successful actions require true representations. Success does not require truth in all and every cases. Under certain circumstances, false representations can systematically cause successful actions. The goal of the chapter is to demonstrate what these defined circumstances are. Success SemanticsThroughout this chapter, we assume a naturalistic theory of semantics, where representations, their content, their truth or falsehood are defined without recurrence to terms which themselves are already intentional. Our argumentation is invariant to what exact version of naturalized semantics is assumed (e.g., Fodor, 1990;Millikan, 1989;Papineau, 1984Papineau, , 2003Dretske, 1981). Now, what does it mean for a representation to be true vs. false or successful vs. unsuccessful? RepresentationWe understand that observer O has representation r, if and only if (iff) r is a (physical or biological) state or signal within O, which has the property of being about something else, that is to have content. To have content can be considered as a mapping from a set of representations R 4/32(from which r is an element of) to a specific set of states in the world external to the observer, the target domain T. 2. (1) Together with the content mapping, when an observer O has re...

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When Misrepresentation is Successful

Zehetleitner

¹

,

Schönbrodt

²

2014

Epistemological Dimensions of Evolutionary Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In the present chapter, we investigate the notion that an action is successful if and only if (iff) it is caused by a true representation. We demonstrate that there indeed exist representations which -even though being false -can systematically lead to successful actions, if specific conditions hold, especially, if there is stochastic noise in the generation of representations and the cost of errors is asymmetrically distributed and the success-relevant feature can only be indirectly assessed via indicator features. Finally, we discuss this observation in relation to illusionary perception and evolutionary epistemology.Keywords: Semantics, success semantics, evolutionary epistemology, teleosemantics, decision theory Final Draft. To appear in: Breyer, T. (2013). Epistemological Foundations of Evolutionary Psychology. New York: Springer. 3/32 When misrepresentation is successfulHow can a representation lead to a successful action? It is widely taken for granted that a representation has to be true in order to be successful (e.g., Shea, 2007;Millikan, 1989; Whyte, 1990;Ramsey & Moore, 1927;Blackburn, 2005). Consider for instance, how could a person successfully sit down on or avoid a chair, unless she has a true visual representation of the chair"s shape and position? Or, to make use of an example of Ramsey in Ramsey and Moore (1927): How can the belief of a chicken, that a certain caterpillar is toxic be useful, unless the caterpillars are actually toxic? It even has been proposed, that "(t)ruth just is the property of a belief that suffices for your getting what you want when you act upon it." (Whyte, 1990, p. 149).Although this notion of truth being a prerequisite for success has a high face validity, we shall argue that it is wrong to suppose that all successful actions require true representations. Success does not require truth in all and every cases. Under certain circumstances, false representations can systematically cause successful actions. The goal of the chapter is to demonstrate what these defined circumstances are. Success SemanticsThroughout this chapter, we assume a naturalistic theory of semantics, where representations, their content, their truth or falsehood are defined without recurrence to terms which themselves are already intentional. Our argumentation is invariant to what exact version of naturalized semantics is assumed (e.g., Fodor, 1990;Millikan, 1989;Papineau, 1984Papineau, , 2003Dretske, 1981). Now, what does it mean for a representation to be true vs. false or successful vs. unsuccessful? RepresentationWe understand that observer O has representation r, if and only if (iff) r is a (physical or biological) state or signal within O, which has the property of being about something else, that is to have content. To have content can be considered as a mapping from a set of representations R 4/32(from which r is an element of) to a specific set of states in the world external to the observer, the target domain T. 2. (1) Together with the content mapping, when an observer O has re...

show abstract