Intuitive Expertise and Irrelevant Options

Horvath, Joachim; Meyer, Karina; Wiegmann, Alex

doi:10.1093/oso/9780198852407.003.0012

Cited by 8 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 31 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…In Experiment 1A, we sought to replicate existing work on order effects in moral judgments of trolley dilemmas Wiegmann & Waldmann, 2014;Wiegmann et al, 2020). We used the standard Switch and Push paradigms.…”

Section: Experiments 1a: Asymmetrical Order Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sacrificing objects instead of persons: Order effects without emotional engagement

Mihailov

Hannikainen

Wiegmann

2023

Philosophical Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper we develop test cases to adjudicate between dual-process and the causal mapping explanations of order effects. Using dilemmas with minimized emotional force, we explore new conditions for order effects to occur. Overall, the results support causal model theory. We produced novel evidence that order effects extend not only to cases with low emotional engagement, but also to specialized judgements about whether an action violates a rule. However, when objects are sacrificed instead of persons the order effect either disappears or becomes symmetrical, contrary to previous theorizing that it is an asymmetrical transfer effect.Causal model theory needs to be developed to include interplays between the moral status of sacrificed entities and computational models of causal mapping. Symmetric order effects remain a puzzle, motivating future research. Though we do not know how to explain them yet, we discuss how symmetric order effects can influence policy decision making.

show abstract

Section: Experiments 1a: Asymmetrical Order Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sacrificing objects instead of persons: Order effects without emotional engagement

Mihailov

Hannikainen

Wiegmann

2023

Philosophical Psychology

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…It goes without saying that philosophers have genuine expertise in some domains: among others, they know more about the history of philosophy, and they have acquired distinct skills, from close, accurate reading to clarity and precision in argumentation. On the other hand, philosophers appear to suffer from the biases that impact lay people's judgments (Machery 2012;Horvath and Wiegmann 2016, Forthcoming;Wiegmann et al 2020): order effects, framing effects, etc., influence some of their judgments (particularly, the judgments about thought experiments) to the same extent as lay people's.…”

Section: Two Objectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Variation Matters to Philosophy

Machery¹

2023

Res Phil.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Experimental philosophers often seem to ignore or downplay the significance of demographic variation in philosophically relevant judgments. This article confirms this impression, discusses why demographic research is overlooked in experimental philosophy, and argues that variation is philosophically significant.Following the groundbreaking research by Jonathan Weinberg, Shaun Nichols, and Steve Stich (2001), part of experimental philosophy has endeavored to assess how much philosophical judgments vary across cultures, languages, religions, generations, age groups, genders, or socioeconomic groups (a research tradition that I will call "comparative experimental philosophy"). 1 Recent large-scale projects such as the Geography of Philosophy Project have extended comparative experimental philosophy in a more systematic direction (Kiper et al. 2022). This project, generously funded by the John Templeton Foundation, has been examining since 2017 how people understand three concepts of philosophical interest, viz. the concepts of knowledge, understanding, and wisdom, across cultures, religions, and languages using a variety of empirical methods: qualitative interviews, computational text analyses of large linguistic corpora in many languages, experimental studies using verbal and visual stimuli, and experimental paradigms drawn from experimental economics. 2 The results of the Geography of Philosophy Project and, more broadly, of the research tradition started by Weinberg et al. (2001) are naturally relevant for psychology and anthropology, 3 but their philosophical relevance might not seem obvious: why does it matter for philosophy if judgments of philosophical interest such as those about beauty, fairness, and love vary? The goal of this article is to offer a response to this question.Here is how I will proceed. In Section 1, I examine why the study of variation has been relatively neglected: I examine various plausible causes, and I also assess whether they justify this neglect. In Section 2, I review the 1 This goal is sometimes put in terms of concepts instead of, or in addition to, judgments, the goal being then to assess how much concepts vary. 2 More information can be found on the project's webpage: www.geographyofphilosophy.com and on its YouTube's channel: www.youtube.com/@geographyofphilosophyproje9275. 3 That said, anthropologists might have some concerns with the meaningfulness of asking philosophical questions to lay people across cultures (see, e.g., Clark Barrett in the following video: www.youtube.com/watch?v=xxMFDZ__MXY).

show abstract

“…A fourth dimension is the number of options, and more precisely the presence of a third option (3O). Past research has shown that introducing a third option in a moral dilemma can dramatically switch participants’ moral preferences (Wiegmann et al, 2020). In the context of moral dilemmas including AVs, Bigman and Gray (2020) have shown that introducing a third option allowing the AV to make a decision at random drastically reduced the relevance of certain factors such as age, gender or social status.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Performative Quantification: Design Choices Impact the Lessons of Empirical Surveys About the Ethics of Autonomous Vehicles

Etienne

Cova

2023

Social Science Computer Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In recent years, researchers have emphasized the relevance of data about commonsense moral judgments for ethical decision-making, notably in the context of debates about autonomous vehicles (AVs). As such, the results of empirical studies such as the Machine Moral Experiment have been influential in debates about the ethics of AVs and some researchers have even put forward methods to automatize ethical decision-making on the basis of such data. In this paper, we argue that data collection is not a neutral process, and the difference in study design can change participants’ answers and the ethical conclusions that can be drawn from them. After showing that participants’ individual answers are stable in the sense that providing them with a second occasion to reflect on their answers does not change them (Study 1), we show that different conclusions regarding participants’ moral preferences can be reached when participants are given a third option allowing AVs to behave randomly (Study 2), and that preference for this third option can be increased in the context of a collective discussion (Study 3). We conclude that design choices will influence the lessons that can be drawn from surveys about participants’ moral judgments about AVs and that these choices are not morally neutral.

show abstract

Intuitive Expertise and Irrelevant Options

Cited by 8 publications

References 31 publications

Sacrificing objects instead of persons: Order effects without emotional engagement

Sacrificing objects instead of persons: Order effects without emotional engagement

Why Variation Matters to Philosophy

Performative Quantification: Design Choices Impact the Lessons of Empirical Surveys About the Ethics of Autonomous Vehicles

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About