Intuitive Dilation?

Hart, Casey; Titelbaum, Michael G.

doi:10.1002/tht3.185

Cited by 11 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 18 publications

(23 reference statements)

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“…25 A further option would be for both your credence in HEADS and your credence in P to adjust, but this is no more appealing than the alternatives. 26 More about why these options are counterintuitive can be found in White (2010), and responses to many of these arguments can be found in Joyce (2010, Sturgeon 2010, and Hart and Titelbaum 2015. In this paper I do not get into the interesting debate over whether dilation is an acceptable consequence of imprecise probabilism.…”

Section: Dilationmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…That the agent's credence in HEADS would (intuitively) be unchanged by seeing the coin land P side up holds only because the agent's credence in P is the range (0,1). In scenarios where the agent's credence in P at t 0 is not symmetrical, intuitively the agent's credence in HEADS should change(Joyce 2010;Sturgeon 2010;Hart and Titelbaum 2015). See also footnote 29.28 Similarly, this holds only because the agent is certain that the coin is fair.…”

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confidence: 99%

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The dispositional account of credence

Mahtani

2018

Philos Stud

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In this paper I offer an alternative-the 'dispositional account'-to the standard account of imprecise probabilism. Whereas for the imprecise probabilist an agent's credal state is modelled by a set of credence functions, on the dispositional account an agent's credal state is modelled by a set of sets of credence functions. On the face of it, the dispositional account looks less elegant than the standard account-so why should we be interested? I argue that the dispositional account is actually simpler, because the dispositional choice behaviour that fixes an agent's credal state is faithfully depicted in the model of that agent's credal state. I explore some of the implications of the account, including a surprising implication for the debate over dilation.

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Section: Dilationmentioning

confidence: 92%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The dispositional account of credence

Mahtani

2018

Philos Stud

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“…It remains to be seen as to whether there are genuine grounds for thinking Condition 2 is false. 6 4.2 At the races Hart and Titelbaum (2015) put forward an example, At the Races, which might suggest that rather than implying it, Condition 2 is incompatible with the Principle of Indifference. 7 Suppose your credence that a toss with a fair coin comes up heads is 1 2 , i.e., P (A|XE) = 1 2 where X says that P * (A) = 1 2 and E is admissible.…”

Section: Cars Fins and Antennaementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Indeed, P (A|A ↔ F ) > P (¬A|A ↔ F ) iff P (AF ) > P (¬A¬F ). 7 Strictly speaking, Hart and Titelbaum (2015) object to an argument of Roger White (2010) rather than Condition 2. However, the assumption they attack, i.e., Equation (5) on p.175, is similar to Condition 2. that Speedy wins but there is additional background information E which says that precisely one horse can win.…”

Section: Cars Fins and Antennaementioning

confidence: 99%

The Principal Principle, admissibility, and normal informal standards of what is reasonable

2021

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This paper highlights the role of Lewis’ Principal Principle and certain auxiliary conditions on admissibility as serving to explicate normal informal standards of what is reasonable. These considerations motivate the presuppositions of the argument that the Principal Principle implies the Principle of Indifference, put forward by Hawthorne et al. (British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 68, 123–131, 2017). They also suggest a line of response to recent criticisms of that argument, due to Pettigrew (British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 71, 605–619, 2020) and Titelbaum and Hart (British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 71(2), 621–632, 2020). The paper also shows that related concerns of Hart and Titelbaum (Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, 4(4), 252–262, 2015) do not undermine the argument of Hawthorne et al. (2017).

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“…4 Lastly, one might try to attack C4. One might try to resist the intuition behind C4 on the grounds that conditioning on a biconditional is somewhat counterintuitive (Hart and Titelbaum 2015;Titelbaum and Hart 2018). Whether or not this is so, the question remains as to what one should do in our scenario when one supposes that two propositions have the same truth value.…”

Section: Attack the Conditionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism

Wallmann

Williamson

2019

Euro Jnl Phil Sci

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This paper poses a problem for Lewis' Principal Principle in a subjective Bayesian framework: we show that, where chances inform degrees of belief, subjective Bayesianism fails to validate normal informal standards of what is reasonable. This problem points to a tension between the Principal Principle and the claim that conditional degrees of belief are conditional probabilities. However, one version of objective Bayesianism has a straightforward resolution to this problem, because it avoids this latter claim. The problem, then, offers some support to this version of objective Bayesianism. Keywords Bayesianism • Principal principle • Subjective Bayesianism • Objective Bayesianism • Pooling We show in Section 1 that standard subjective Bayesianism has a problem in accommodating David Lewis' Principal Principle. In Section 2, we see that the problem does not beset a recent version of objective Bayesianism. In Section 3, we consider three possible ways in which a subjectivist might try to avoid the problem but we argue that none of these suggestions succeed. We conclude that the problem favours objective Bayesianism over subjective Bayesianism (Section 4). In Section 4 we also compare our results to some other lines of recent work.

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Intuitive Dilation?

Cited by 11 publications

References 18 publications

The dispositional account of credence

The dispositional account of credence

The Principal Principle, admissibility, and normal informal standards of what is reasonable

The Principal Principle and subjective Bayesianism

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