Intuitive and Reflective Responses in Philosophy

Byrd, Nick

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2787284

Cited by 7 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 289 publications

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“…This pre-registered study was based on a prior study (Appendix; Byrd, 2014) that was motivated in large part by hypotheses generated from the above-mentioned evidence (1-3 below) as well as potentially competing hypotheses posed by anonymous reviewers and fellow philosophers (4-5).…”

Section: The Current Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…So far only a relatively small study of philosophers and their reflection test performance has been published (Yaden & Anderson, 2021), but this and prior work on the issue used less than optimal reflection tests (Byrd, 2014;Appendix). So there is still a need for a larger conceptual replication and extension of existing findings involving both laypeople and philosophers using both original and state-of-the-art reflection tests as well as measures of both intuitions about particular thought experiments and acceptance of more general philosophical views.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Great Minds do not Think Alike: Philosophers’ Views Predicted by Reflection, Education, Personality, and Other Demographic Differences

Byrd

2022

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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Prior research found correlations between reflection test performance and philosophical tendencies among laypeople. In two large studies (total N = 1299)-one pre-registered-many of these correlations were replicated in a sample that included both laypeople and philosophers. For example, reflection test performance predicted preferring atheism over theism and instrumental harm over harm avoidance on the trolley problem. However, most reflection-philosophy correlations were undetected when controlling for other factors such as numeracy, preferences for open-minded thinking, personality, philosophical training, age, and gender. Nonetheless, some correlations between reflection and philosophical views survived this multivariate analysis and were only partially confounded with either education or self-reported reasoning preferences. Unreflective thinking still predicted believing in God whereas reflective thinking still predicted believing that (a) proper names like 'Santa' do not necessarily refer to entities that actually exist and (b) science does reveal the fundamental nature of the world. So some robust relationships between reflection and philosophical tendencies were detected even among philosophers, and yet there was clearly more to the link between reflection and philosophy. To this end, demographic and metaphilosophical hypotheses are considered.

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Section: The Current Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Great Minds do not Think Alike: Philosophers’ Views Predicted by Reflection, Education, Personality, and Other Demographic Differences

Byrd

2022

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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“…Across several studies, Schwitzgebel and Rust (2010) found that ethicists were no more likely to exhibit various moral behaviors than their colleagues who are professors in other areas of philosophy. Some studies show that the number of philosophy courses one has taken is predictive of better performance on the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Byrd, 2014;Frederick, 2005;Livengood et al, 2010), which measures one's tendency to engage in more careful analytic, as opposed to intuitive, modes of thinking. These findings focus on professional philosophers and help to characterize this population, but they still do not address the psychological factors that might impact their views.…”

Section: Experimental Philosophymentioning

confidence: 99%

The psychology of philosophy: Associating philosophical views with psychological traits in professional philosophers

Yaden

Anderson

2021

Philosophical Psychology

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Do psychological traits predict philosophical views? We administered the PhilPapers Survey, created by David Bourget and David Chalmers, which consists of 30 views on central philosophical topics (e.g., epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language) to a sample of professional philosophers (N = 314). We extended the PhilPapers survey to measure a number of psychological traits, such as personality, numeracy, wellbeing, lifestyle, and life experiences. We also included nontechnical 'translations' of these views for eventual use in other populations. We found limited to no support for the notion that personality or demographics predict philosophical views. We did, however, find that some psychological traits were predictive of philosophical views, even after strict correction for multiple comparisons. Findings include: higher interest in numeracy predicted physicalism, naturalism, and consequentialism; lower levels of well-being and higher levels of mental illness predicted hard determinism; using substances such as psychedelics and marijuana predicted non-realist and subjectivist views of morality and aesthetics; having had a transformative or self-transcendent experience predicted theism and idealism. We discuss whether or not these empirical results have philosophical implications, while noting that 68% of our sample of professional philosophers indicated that such findings would indeed have philosophical value.

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“…Notably, much of this work shows how intuitions are often sensitive to factors that are not normative (i.e. truth-tracking) and hence are best described as cognitive biases (Andow 2015;Byrd 2014;Livengood et al 2010;Pinillos et al 2011;Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2015). This work also indicates that philosophers tend to more carefully 'check' their intuitions with deliberate, reflective thought than do non-philosophersa finding which is hardly surprising given the goals of philosophical education, but nonetheless significant and gratifying to see empirically supported (e.g., Andow 2015;Byrd 2014;Livengood et al 2010).…”

Section: X-phi Reconsideredmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…truth-tracking) and hence are best described as cognitive biases (Andow 2015;Byrd 2014;Livengood et al 2010;Pinillos et al 2011;Schwitzgebel and Cushman 2015). This work also indicates that philosophers tend to more carefully 'check' their intuitions with deliberate, reflective thought than do non-philosophersa finding which is hardly surprising given the goals of philosophical education, but nonetheless significant and gratifying to see empirically supported (e.g., Andow 2015;Byrd 2014;Livengood et al 2010). Some influential work in X-phi has also shed new light on the psychology of social and ethical reasoning, in particular judgements of intentionality and responsibility (Knobe 2003;Shaun and Knobe 2007).…”

Section: X-phi Reconsideredmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mapping Cognitive Structure onto the Landscape of Philosophical Debate: an Empirical Framework with Relevance to Problems of Consciousness, Free will and Ethics

Friedman

Jack

2017

Rev.Phil.Psych.

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There has been considerable debate in the literature as to whether work in experimental philosophy (X-Phi) actually makes any significant contribution to philosophy. One stated view is that many X-Phi projects, notwithstanding their focus on topics relevant to philosophy, contribute little to philosophical thought. Instead, it has been claimed the contribution they make appears to be to cognitive science. In contrast to this view, here we argue that at least one approach to X-Phi makes a contribution which parallels, and also extends, historically salient forms of philosophical analysis, especially contributions from Immanuel Kant, William James, Peter F. Strawson and Thomas Nagel. The framework elaborated here synthesizes philosophical theory with empirical evidence from psychology and neuroscience and applies it to three perennial philosophical problems. According to this account, the origin of these three problems can be illuminated by viewing them as arising from a tension between two distinct types of cognition, each of which is associated with anatomically independent and functionally inhibitory neural networks. If the parallel we draw, between an empirical project and historically highly influential examples of philosophical analysis, is viewed as convincing, it follows that work in the cognitive sciences can contribute directly to

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Intuitive and Reflective Responses in Philosophy

Cited by 7 publications

References 289 publications

Great Minds do not Think Alike: Philosophers’ Views Predicted by Reflection, Education, Personality, and Other Demographic Differences

Great Minds do not Think Alike: Philosophers’ Views Predicted by Reflection, Education, Personality, and Other Demographic Differences

The psychology of philosophy: Associating philosophical views with psychological traits in professional philosophers

Mapping Cognitive Structure onto the Landscape of Philosophical Debate: an Empirical Framework with Relevance to Problems of Consciousness, Free will and Ethics

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