Intrusion Detection in Online Controller of Digital Microfluidic Biochips

Abstract

Efficient and cost optimal feature of microfluidic based biochips are inspiring in automation of clinical diagnostics. Many laboratory oriented biochemical tests are transfigured into on chip operations. Droplet based microfluidic is a sub-category of microfluidic sciences. Actually this type of fluidic device is capable of manipulating multiple droplets concurrently. The main aim of droplet routing in a Digital Microfluidic Biochip (DMFB) is to find an efficient path for each droplet from a designated source electrode to a destination electrode under different fluidic and static constraints of microfluidic operations. The whole operation can be make more scalable and controlled through a programmable intelligent controller. In order to match up with the current needs and required flexibility of commercial applications, this intelligent controller has to take care of many issues like pin optimization, cross reference minimization and contamination detection during routing. This makes the task of intelligent controller quite complex and challenging. These online controllers need to control multiple biochip boards at different time intervals to promote optimum resource and time utilization. However, online controllers are very susceptible to wide range of cyber attacks. In recent literature, varieties of cyber physical attacks have been reported which cause remarkable impairment on the operation of physical system. This proposed method is able to adjudge such malicious operations at the physical system level. This will help to monitor the behavior of the physical operation and can stall it under any abnormality in operation. Experimental findings show that the proposed technique can detect the errors and superfluous operations accurately with minimum consumption of computing resources. Comparative performance of error detection efficiency shows betterment over the existing methods.

Security assessment for routing-based synthesis on cyberphysical MEDA-based digital microfluidic biochip

“…Various kinds of such attacks are listed in Table 1. Examples of such attacks in cyberphysical system like stealth attacks, replay attacks and covert attacks [6] are the example of static attack [30]. They lead to output attacks that are consistent with the measurements equation, system dynamics, and reset the measurements and measurements can be cancelled, respectively.…”

“…/doi.org/10.1007/s42452-021-04647-, M 2(4,7) , M 3(5,2) , and M 4(6,8) . Before starting very next layer of PCR mixing operations, we need to split M 1 , M 2 , M 3 and M 4 mixer droplets and merge accordingly using the Split_and_Merge algorithm (algorithm is shown in Fig.14) which will require another 4 time-stamps as shown in Fig.15a-b.…”