Introduction*

Fink, Jakob Leth

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511997969.001

Cited by 5 publications

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“…This endoxic method is, however, not identical with dialectic. As Brunschwig (1967) xxii–xxiv, Devereux (2015) 131–4 and Fink (2012) 2 put it, dialectic is the art of rule-governed debates between a questioner and an answerer in public. It is directed at someone else and concerned with opinion, not necessarily with the truth ( Topics [ Top .]…”

Section: Varieties Of Aristotle's Methods Of Ethicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Eleatic Stranger's Method in Aristotle's Ethics

Inamura

2023

Camb. class. j.

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This article examines Aristotle's method for defining the concept of happiness in his Eudemian and Nicomachean ethics. In particular, the article draws attention to a methodological passage (Eth. Eud. 1.6 1216b26–35), in which he claims that ‘If we start from what is truly yet not clearly spoken, clarity will be won as we make progress’. This expression comes from Plato's Statesman 275a and 281d. Aristotle then seems to adopt the Eleatic stranger's method in two ways to clarify the initial imprecise statement that happiness is the greatest and best of human goods: first, he distinguishes a target object from other similar objects, and second, he refers to appearances as illustrations to clarify more abstract ethical concepts. This analysis illuminates the influence of the later Platonic method on Aristotle's ethics from a new angle.

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Section: Varieties Of Aristotle's Methods Of Ethicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Eleatic Stranger's Method in Aristotle's Ethics

Inamura

2023

Camb. class. j.

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“…3 Para Aristóteles, la dialéctica era una disciplina útil para la filosofía, porque permite acceder a los primeros principios (Tópicos I 2), mientras que, para Platón, sobre todo en los diálogos de madurez, era epistéme en sentido estricto (República VI-VII). Véase Fink (2012).…”

Section: Acerca De Por Qué Aristóteles Llama a Zenón El Inventor De L...unclassified

Acerca de por qué Aristóteles llama a Zenón el inventor de la dialéctica

Seggiaro

2023

ERF

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El Sofista es una obra actualmente perdida de Aristóteles de la que se conservan escasos fragmentos. En tres de ellos, 1a, 1b y 1c, el Estagirita le adjudica a Zenón la invención de la dialéctica, pese a que las estrategias argumentativas que esta técnica supone son rastreables en diversas obras pertenecientes a diversos ámbitos: la literatura, la historia, la filosofía, la medicina, etc., incluso con anterioridad al desarrollo del pensamiento de este último filósofo. Esto nos lleva a preguntarnos sobre el sentido de esta caracterización y cuáles son los motivos por los cuales Aristóteles la realiza. En este trabajo nos proponemos analizar esta cuestión. Para ello, previamente examinaremos los usos de ciertas prácticas, consideradas posteriormente como dialécticas, por pensadores y escritores que antecedieron o fueron contemporáneos a Zenón. Tras hacer eso, nos centraremos en la reconstrucción de los fragmentos 1a-c del Sofista a la luz de otros textos del corpus, como, por ejemplo, Metafísica III 4 y Física VI 9.

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“… 4 There are a number of detailed reconstructions of the basic features of this practice in the literature (Castelnérac and Marion 2009 , 2013 ; Fink 2012 ). Scholars disagree on how best to understand the concept of dialectic, even in the restricted context of ancient Greek thought (Duncombe and Dutilh Novaes 2016 ).…”

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Two Types of Refutation in Philosophical Argumentation

Novaes

2022

Argumentation

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In this paper, I highlight the significance of practices of refutation in philosophical inquiry, that is, practices of showing that a claim, person or theory is wrong. I present and contrast two prominent approaches to philosophical refutation: refutation in ancient Greek dialectic (elenchus), in its Socratic variant as described in Plato’s dialogues, and as described in Aristotle’s logical texts; and the practice of providing counterexamples to putative definitions familiar from twentieth century analytic philosophy, focusing on the so-called Gettier problem. Moreover, I discuss Lakatos’ method of proofs and refutations, as it offers insightful observations on the dynamics between arguments, refutations, and counterexamples. Overall, I argue that dialectic, in particular in its Socratic variant, is especially suitable for the philosophical purpose of questioning the obvious, as it invites reflection on one’s own doxastic commitments and on the tensions and inconsistencies within one’s set of beliefs. By contrast, the counterexample-based approach to philosophical refutation can give rise to philosophical theorizing that is overly focused on hairsplitting disputes, thus becoming alienated from the relevant human experiences. Insofar as philosophical inquiry treads the fine line between questioning the obvious while still seeking to say something significant about human experiences, perhaps a certain amount of what Lakatos describes as ‘monster-barring’—a rejection of overly fanciful, artificial putative counterexamples—has its place in philosophical argumentation.

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Introduction*

Cited by 5 publications

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The Eleatic Stranger's Method in Aristotle's Ethics

The Eleatic Stranger's Method in Aristotle's Ethics

Acerca de por qué Aristóteles llama a Zenón el inventor de la dialéctica

Two Types of Refutation in Philosophical Argumentation

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