Introduction: Understanding African Politics: Bringing the State Back In

Cheeseman, Nic

doi:10.1017/9781316562888.001

Cited by 12 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 75 publications

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“…Our findings do not mean that informal institutions and relationships are not important. As Cheeseman (2018: 27) observes, formal institutions and informal institutions need not be rivals but rather they may have a symbiotic relationship. Some of the findings of our study echo those of studies done on different world regions which supports the notion that certain universal causal processes may be at play when it comes to constitutional change.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Changing the Rules: Institutions, Party Systems, and the Frequency of Constitutional Amendments in Africa

2022

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What factors influence constitutional stability in the emerging democracies of Sub-Saharan Africa? This is an important question that has never been addressed in a systematic cross-national study of Africa's emerging democracies. Using the Comparative Constitutions Project dataset and our own original dataset for veto players and party systems, we examine the influence of veto players and party system characteristics on the frequency of constitutional amendments in the electoral periods between 1990 and 2020 in forty-one African countries. Our results provide broad support for the veto players theory. More specifically, we find that as the number of actors needed to approve of a constitutional amendment increases, the likelihood a constitution will be amended decreases. The strength of party veto players also influences whether a constitution is likely to be amended. Furthermore, our results underscore the importance of party system characteristics in influencing amendment frequency.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Changing the Rules: Institutions, Party Systems, and the Frequency of Constitutional Amendments in Africa

2022

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“…The coping strategies often yield ‘unitarist reflexes’ that undermine state-building, development and liberties (Obadare, 2006: 395). This is widely the case whether it involves representative democracy or outright autocracy (Cheeseman, 2018a, 2018b; McCauley, 2017). Examples include Nigeria’s federalism that has had several setbacks instigated by ethnicity, religion and natural resource governance (Adamolekun and Kincaid, 1991; Bah, 2005; Diamond, 1988; LeVan, 2015; Obi and Oriola, 2018; Suberu, 1993), the unitary system of Kenya that was marred by ethno-clientelist grievances and political violence prior to the 2010 devolution (Fjelde and Höglund, 2018; Gutiérrez-Romero, 2010; Orr, 2019; Vanden Eynde et al, 2018) and the suppressive regime of Sudan’s Al Bashir that undermined non-Arab participation in public life until its downfall in 2019 (Arman, 2019; Elnaiem, 2019; Sefa-Nyarko, 2016a).…”

Section: Institutional Design Complexities In Multi-ethnic Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Ethnicity in Electoral Politics in Ghana: Colonial Legacies and the Constitution as Determinants

Sefa-Nyarko

2020

Critical Sociology

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This paper assesses political allegiances in Ghana, positioning its ethno-political divide into the historical contexts of institutional design and colonialism in Africa. It argues that whilst the colonial policy of Indirect Rule solidified ethnicity in Africa, post-colonial governments used it differently, with varying effects on institutional design and state-building. In concert with other constitutional provisions, Ghana’s Article 55 of 1992 Constitution has curtailed extreme ethnic politics through the limit it places on ethnicity in party politics. Whilst outlawing ethnicity in politics, the constitution provides other depoliticised outlets for expressing diversity, especially through decentralisation and legitimisation of chieftaincy institutions. Despite these safeguarding provisions, the Asantes and Ewes have consistently taken entrenched political positions since 1992, and this article explicates some of the drivers using longitudinal election results. It draws on institutional design complexities in multi-ethnic societies in Africa to propose lessons and convey implications for Ghana’s Fourth Republic Constitution.

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“…Such a research agenda is consistent with recent revisionist perspectives in African political studies, which are beginning to give more attention to formal institutions (elections and electoral systems, term limits, parliaments, courts, local governments, constitutional change, etc.) and their complex interactions with informal practices and processes (Cheeseman 2018). extend, deepen, and interweave the fields of African studies, federal studies, and comparative politics.…”

Section: Federal Impulses Across Africamentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Federalism Matter in Africa?

Suberu¹

2019

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The academic study of federalism is somewhat unfashionable in Africa, where formal institutions are often regarded as superficial, ephemeral and ineffective, while informal norms, networks, processes and practices are considered to be the real bedrock and substance of politics. Indeed, for decades, a “neo-patrimonial theoretical framework” or “institution-less school” has been the prevailing paradigm for analyzing African governance and politics (Cheeseman 2018, 10-12). As a concept, neo-patrimonialism focuses on the pathologies of personal, “big man” rule, corruption, predation, patron-client networks and other informal ruling mechanisms in Africa. African structures of personalist rule and relations, in this neo-patrimonial conceptual framework, have little or no place for formal federalist institutions of self-rule, shared rule, and limited rule. Consequently, federalism is often regarded as irrelevant, unviable, or invariably doomed to degradation, extinction, and administrative, fiscal, and political recentralization in Africa’s neo-patrimonial governance eco-system. “In short,” in the words of a leading scholar of decentralization in Africa, “federalism can hardly matter where [formal] institutions themselves have little import” (Dickovick 2012, 3).

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Introduction: Understanding African Politics: Bringing the State Back In

Cited by 12 publications

References 75 publications

Changing the Rules: Institutions, Party Systems, and the Frequency of Constitutional Amendments in Africa

Changing the Rules: Institutions, Party Systems, and the Frequency of Constitutional Amendments in Africa

Ethnicity in Electoral Politics in Ghana: Colonial Legacies and the Constitution as Determinants

Does Federalism Matter in Africa?

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