“…They range from naïve realist ( Gibson, 1979 ; Chemero, 2011 ) to consciousness oriented ( Hoffman, 2008 ) to immanent realism ( Albertazzi, 2005 ); and proponents of the extended mind ( Clark and Chalmers, 1998 ) explaining perceiving as a process of motor-sensory integrations ( O’Regan and Noë, 2001 ; Noë and O’Regan, 2002 ). Then there is a wide set of embodied enactivists (a review in Ward et al, 2017 ), from those grounding in neurophysiology their negation of the representationalist viewpoint in perception, such as autopoietic enactivism ( Varela et al, 1991 ; Varela, 1996 ; Thompson and Varela, 2001 ; Thompson, 2004 , 2007 ; Thompson et al, 2005 ; Thompson and Zahavi, 2007 ), radical enactivism ( Hutto and Myin, 2013 ), sensori-motor enactivism ( Di Paolo et al, 2017 ), etc. (see Roberts, 2018 ).…”