Introduction: The Italian Animal—A Heterodox Tradition

Zoofolkloristics: Imagination as a Critical Component

“…As investigators continue to engage in critical readings of past texts, assumptions become challenged and a landscape of the (human) mind and ‘heart’ starts to emerge that is far more picturesque than previously imagined. For instance, due to its heavily Catholic and creationist tradition, accompanied by the reality of a predominantly peasant society, attached to tradition and facing economic hardship, the Italian society has not been perceived as particularly preoccupied with animal welfare and ethics [ 61 ] (p. 2). However, closer readings have led scholars to argue convincingly for an anti-Cartesian dimension of Italian philosophy.…”

“…However, closer readings have led scholars to argue convincingly for an anti-Cartesian dimension of Italian philosophy. In the Italian tradition, Cimatti and Salzani explain, ‘a neat boundary between human and nonhuman, consciousness and unconsciousness, res cogitans and res extensa never existed’ [ 61 ] (p. 8–9). Utilising Francis d’Assisi as one of the examples, the authors note that when Francis spoke to birds, he ‘implicitly assumed that the difference between their life and his own life was not metaphysical; bird life is simply different from human life’ [ 61 ] (p. 9).…”

“…In the Italian tradition, Cimatti and Salzani explain, ‘a neat boundary between human and nonhuman, consciousness and unconsciousness, res cogitans and res extensa never existed’ [ 61 ] (p. 8–9). Utilising Francis d’Assisi as one of the examples, the authors note that when Francis spoke to birds, he ‘implicitly assumed that the difference between their life and his own life was not metaphysical; bird life is simply different from human life’ [ 61 ] (p. 9). Upon closer inspection, boundaries in other traditions may turn out to be more fluid than inherited knowledge would have it, perhaps validating Karl Steel’s position: as he makes an interesting case for medieval posthumanism, Steel argues against the temporal limitations of ‘post’ and ‘proto’, proposing instead that ‘posthumanism does not follow humanism: rather, it is inherent in its own claims’ [ 62 ] (p. 3).…”