Introduction: Normativity, Reasons, Rationality

Robertson, Simon

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199572939.003.0001

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 18 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Dancy 2004, Chap. 2;Broome 2004;Robertson 2008Robertson , 2009 3), in the sense of specifying the action (or range of actions) most strongly favoured by whatever reasons there are in that situation. So, just as 'A is not (morally) permitted to φ' entails that 'A has a (moral) obligation not to φ', we can understand 'permissible' (unmodified) in relation to 'ought' (unmodified) analogously: 'if A is not permitted to φ, then A ought not φ'.…”

Section: The Wide-scope Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Epistemic constraints on practical normativity

Robertson

2010

Synthese

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

What is the relation between what we ought to do, on the one hand, and our epistemic access to the ought-giving facts, on the other? In assessing this, it is common to distinguish 'objective' from 'subjective' oughts. Very roughly, on the objectivist conception what an agent ought to do is determined by ought-giving facts in such a way that does not depend on the agent's beliefs about, or epistemic access to, those facts; whereas on the subjectivist conception, what an agent ought to do depends on his beliefs. This paper defends the need for, and explicates, a third category of 'ought': 'warranted oughts'. Section 1 introduces the distinction between objective and subjective 'oughts'. Sections 2-3 draw attention to some serious problems with each. Section 4 examines, though rejects, a recent attempt to replace subjective 'oughts' with objective 'wide-scope oughts' operating on belief-action combinations. Section 5 explicates the notion of a warranted 'ought' and defends the account against some possible objections. The resulting a picture is one in which an adequate analysis of practical normativity requires both objective and warranted 'oughts'. Section 6 concludes by responding to a worry about countenancing both.

show abstract

Section: The Wide-scope Accountmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…At least given some further claims about the connections between 'ought', 'most reason' and 'a reason'-seeRobertson 2008Robertson , 2009 …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic constraints on practical normativity

Robertson

2010

Synthese

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…

1 A valid argument can lead to a conclusion about reasons or oughts only if there is a premise that includes reasons or oughts.2 See e.g. Fabianne Peter (2019), Simon Robertson (2012) and Daniel Star, ed (2018) for discussions of this "reasons first" view, defended e.g. by

…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…2 See e.g. Fabianne Peter (2019), Simon Robertson (2012) and Daniel Star, ed (2018) for discussions of this "reasons first" view, defended e.g. by…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%