Introduction

The Comandante in his Labyrinth: Fidel Castro and his Legacy

“…197 But the community of interest between the USSR and Cuba was strong and Khrushchev invited Fidel to Moscow and some of the damage was repaired. 198 During this visit (in April and May of 1963) Castro and his hosts glossed over their differences and agreed a modus vivendi. Castro paid warm tribute to the Soviet sacrifices in the Great Patriotic War and declared that, '[The USSR] did not hesitate to assume the risks of a severe war in defense of our little country.…”

“…He was very abusive about Khrushchev and compared the contemporary position to the situation on the eve of the Nazi attack on the USSR in 1941. 196 Stressing his initial reluctance to accept the missiles, Fidel concedes that the resolution of the Crisis led to a severe deterioration in relations with Moscow. 197 But the community of interest between the USSR and Cuba was strong and Khrushchev invited Fidel to Moscow and some of the damage was repaired.…”

To Coerce or Reward? Theorizing Wedge Strategies in Alliance Politics

“…K. I. Koval, the Soviet vice minister of external trade who was in charge of overseeing economic aid to China, complained to Khrushchev that Soviet industry could not provide what China wanted, and even Khrushchev himself bitterly recollected that the Soviet Union could not meet China's demands, as the Soviets could not even produce enough for themselves domestically. 126 The Soviet Union became critical of Mao's Great Leap Forward, which became one of the main sources of mutual frustrations between Beijing and Moscow, precisely because the Soviets feared they would have to assume huge additional costs for bailing out China when Mao's radical attempts failed. 127 US policy toward Taiwan and a tough diplomatic stance against Beijing also contributed to the rift between China and the Soviet Union.…”

Olympics in divided Berlin? Popular culture and political imagination at the Cold War frontier

“…Without a clear substantive return, Khrushchev was unlikely to have assessed the costs and benefits favourably -especially when pre-empted on the publicity, and at a time (post-Cuba) when the theatrical or 'hypomanic' side of his character had given way to the 'depressive' . 53 Moreover, any interest by Khrushchev could only have deepened Ulbricht's trepidations. Underscoring the gap in German-German freedom and prosperity, the Olympics would have raised the issue of whether Easterners could attend the Western events.…”