Introduction: Comparing the legislative performance of legislatures

Arter, David

doi:10.1080/13572330600875423

Cited by 45 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 9 publications

(9 reference statements)

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“…At the heart of the hand-out mechanism lies the problem of the identification of the author of a bill (Marsh and Read 1988, Mattson 1995, Arter 2006a, 2006b.…”

Section: The Cabinet To Party Group Hand-out Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bills from the Floor: Why Governing Party Groups Initiate their Own Legislation

Däubler

2011

The Journal of Legislative Studies

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In parliamentary systems, why do party groups of the government camp initiate their own bills instead of going through the cabinet? This article suggests that such governing party group bills occur for three reasons: (a) cabinets hand out bills to the parties on the floor; (b) party groups or MPs want to signal to constituencies; or (c) parties on the floor are dissatisfied with cabinet policy making. Arguing that the absolute and relative importance of these explanations varies with institutional context, country-specific hypotheses with regard to the number of governing party group bills in Germany are tested. As expected, mechanisms (a) and (c) are especially important in explaining the occurrence of governing party group legislation in Germany.

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“…At the heart of the hand-out mechanism lies the problem of the identification of the author of a bill (Marsh and Read 1988, Mattson 1995, Arter 2006a, 2006b.…”

Section: The Cabinet To Party Group Hand-out Mechanismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bills from the Floor: Why Governing Party Groups Initiate their Own Legislation

Däubler

2011

The Journal of Legislative Studies

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“…25 This exercise of evaluating the effect of Congress institutionalization on "the nature of policy output" is a step in the direction suggested by Arter (2006), arguing about "the need for systematic output analysis in comparative legislative research" and about the need of "indicators with which to make at least a rudimentary cross-national assessment of legislative performance" (2006: 245). Standard errors in parentheses, observations in brackets Each cell corresponds to an individual regression for a sample of democracies since 2000 controlling for GDPpc and regional dummies *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1…”

Section: Congress Institutionalization and The Features Of Policiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Institutionalization of Congress(Es) in Latin America and Beyond

2012

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent. Terms of use: Documents inThe unauthorized commercial use of Bank documents is prohibited and may be punishable under the Bank's policies and/or applicable laws. Copyright ©Inter-American Development Bank. This working paper may be reproduced for any non-commercial purpose. It may also be reproduced in any academic journal indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, with previous consent by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. Cataloging-in-Publication AbstractThis paper proposes an agenda for the study of the determinants and the processes by which strong policymaking institutions emerge, with emphasis on the most central democratic institution: the legislature. It reviews extant theories of institutionalization, and proposes further ways of specifying and studying the concept. It emphasizes the notion that investments and beliefs are the driving force of Congress institutionalization and of its relevance in the policymaking process. Making use of several indicators of Congress institutionalization, it provides evidence suggesting that Congress institutionalization has an impact on the qualities of public policies and on economic and social development outcomes. It also explores some "constitutional" factors that may promote Congress institutionalization. Given that a central theoretical argument of this paper is that the institutionalization of legislatures is a process that includes various self-reinforcing dynamics, the paper also undertakes the preliminary steps in developing a comparative case study of the evolution of Congress institutionalization in two Latin American countries: Argentina and Chile.JEL Codes: D70, D72, H0

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“…2 While problems of corruption and implementation methods persist, there are several generally agreed upon targets for environmental reform. In the case of the Philippines, Lippman [42] stated that "The environment was a natural setting for cross-sectoral linkages because it combined the mission's local governance and natural resources management programs with the government's commitment to decentralization and concern about the environment."…”

Section: Legislative Engagement Programming (Lep)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Examples of poor management of state resources in authoritarian developing world contexts have abounded. In a functioning democracy, however, legislatures are entrusted with "the responsibility to make sure that a state spends money well and wisely, that it delivers good and appropriate policy, and that it steers the nation admirably and surely" [1] Arter [2] emphasizes that legislatures need not only sufficient capacity and operational functionality but also the political will and ability to utilize the first two prerequisites to actually carry out their responsibilities. Other scholars of legislative functioning stress the need for openness and visibility of legislative actions.…”

Section: Legislative Support Programming: Evolving From Strengtheningmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Arter [13] emphasizes that a necessary requirement for legislative effectiveness and legislative autonomy is that the legislature can acquire the information it needs to examine government measures without need to depend on information to do so supplied by executive sources. The goal has been to provide legislators and staff with access to the knowledge and information necessary for informed public policy decision making.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Searching for the Holy Grail: The Evolution of USAID Legislative Support Programming

McMahon¹

2017

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Over the past three decades the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has undertaken programming designed to support legislatures in playing their role as an integral part of democratic governance. The particular areas of emphasis in programming have evolved due to experience gained, shifting policy priorities, and changes in resource levels. The parabola of assistance arcs from a) basic legislative technical and material assistance to b) an emphasis on legislative modernization plans and champions to c) a broader-based legislative "engagement" approach linking legislative support activities with cross-sectoral policy development and implementation. The latter approach is designed to foster economic and social development. We explore the reasons for this evolution and posit that there has been a move in the direction of USAID programming to support activities to promote integrated and broader development goals. We suggest that there are problems and challenges related to this approach; legislative engagement is not necessarily the alpha and omega of legislative functioning. We conclude however, that despite these challenges, ignoring the interface between legislative support and development may negatively impact the attainment of developmental goals and marginalize legislative support as a subject worthy of USAID focus.

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Introduction: Comparing the legislative performance of legislatures

Cited by 45 publications

References 9 publications

Bills from the Floor: Why Governing Party Groups Initiate their Own Legislation

Bills from the Floor: Why Governing Party Groups Initiate their Own Legislation

On the Institutionalization of Congress(Es) in Latin America and Beyond

Searching for the Holy Grail: The Evolution of USAID Legislative Support Programming

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