Beyond the Regulatory Polity? 2013
DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199662821.003.0001
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Introduction: Beyond Market Regulation. Analysing the European Integration of Core State Powers

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Cited by 43 publications
(46 citation statements)
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“…These incentives create demand for negative integration, i.e., the removal of economic barriers. In addition, increasing levels of economic interdependence produce policy externalities, which in turn create demand for integration by regulation and supranational policy co-ordination (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2014;Mattli 1999;Mattli and Stone Sweet 2012;Moravcsik 1991). In addition, economic integration is typically an area of low autonomy and identity costs.…”
Section: Comparative Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…These incentives create demand for negative integration, i.e., the removal of economic barriers. In addition, increasing levels of economic interdependence produce policy externalities, which in turn create demand for integration by regulation and supranational policy co-ordination (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2014;Mattli 1999;Mattli and Stone Sweet 2012;Moravcsik 1991). In addition, economic integration is typically an area of low autonomy and identity costs.…”
Section: Comparative Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As Schimmelfenning notes (2015, 6), the policies that best suit the integration dynamics that are described by the new intergovernmentalism are in "core state powers" (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs 2013) -that is, areas where integration entails high sovereignty and identity costs for the member states. This is the case of economic and budgetary cooperation, of which the European Council quickly established itself as the 'gouvernement economique' (Fabbrini 2013 However, "the extension of the ordinary legislative procedure in successive treaty revisions does not eo ipso signal more supranationalism" (Bickerton et al 2015b, 733).…”
Section: The Rise Of New Intergovernmentalismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Sovereignty concerns become relevant whenever the EU acts in areas that are, symbolically or factually, close to the core competences of the nation‐state. So‐called ‘core state powers’ are policy domains that have historically been under the exclusive control of the state or are essential for its identity and security (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs ; see also Hoffmann ). Within the EU's policy portfolio, this is the case in particular for monetary policy, foreign and defence affairs, or justice and internal security policies.…”
Section: Capacity Sovereignty and Differentiation In Eu Legislative mentioning
confidence: 99%