Incentives for Global Public Health 2010
DOI: 10.1017/cbo9780511750786.003
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Introduction: Access to essential medicines: public health and international law

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Cited by 12 publications
(12 citation statements)
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“…Several alternative proposals for rewarding intellectual labor in an era of globalization have been put forth. These include the creation of streamlined compulsory licensing and parallel importing mechanisms, 88 tierbased IPRs, 89 advanced market commitments, 90 prize funds, 91 health impact funds, 92 patent pools, 93 generic open licenses, 94 and south-south regional partnerships in discovery-based industries. 95 The unique ethical challenges posed by IPRs in an era of globalization suggest that one or more of these proposals may provide a more ethically justifiable alternative.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Several alternative proposals for rewarding intellectual labor in an era of globalization have been put forth. These include the creation of streamlined compulsory licensing and parallel importing mechanisms, 88 tierbased IPRs, 89 advanced market commitments, 90 prize funds, 91 health impact funds, 92 patent pools, 93 generic open licenses, 94 and south-south regional partnerships in discovery-based industries. 95 The unique ethical challenges posed by IPRs in an era of globalization suggest that one or more of these proposals may provide a more ethically justifiable alternative.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This price control, therefore, raises issues about its effect in limiting access to affordable drugs required by people in developing countries to fight diseases and infections (Noehrenberg, , pp. 170–175; Pogge, , p. 79). This is more so where one patent holder holds a patent right to an essential life‐saving drug with no therapeutic substitute, leaving consumers without a choice.…”
Section: Part Ii: Patents the Trips Agreement And Access To Essentimentioning
confidence: 99%
“…An alternative would be to offer innovators a fixed amount of money per QALY. This would remove uncertainty for innovators but impose uncertainty on member states regarding the annual cost of the HIF (Pogge, 2010). Unlike the mandatory prize fund proposed by Love and Hubbard, the voluntary HIF would be targeted at medicines for neglected infectious diseases in particular, while innovations with very high market value would still be distributed under the patent system (Hollis and Pogge, 2008).…”
Section: Are Pull Programmes Suitable For Promoting Research Into Negmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Because of the lack of a public health infrastructure in poor countries, patients often receive unsuitable products or suitable products that are not used in the right way (Mrazek and Mossialos, 2003). This ‘last-mile problem’ would be mitigated in a prize system in which companies would have an incentive to ensure that products are used properly by cooperating with governments and non-governmental organisations (Pogge, 2010). …”
Section: Are Pull Programmes Suitable For Promoting Research Into Negmentioning
confidence: 99%