Introduction: A Conceptual Framework for Engagement with de facto States

Ker‐Lindsay, James; Berg, Eiki

doi:10.1080/17449057.2018.1495362

Cited by 67 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 21 publications

(17 reference statements)

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“…The second type is what I call “latent sovereignty.” I apply this term to third-party acts that imply acknowledgment of or sophisticated interaction with a parallel authority on the ground within the state. What Ker-Lindsay and Berg (2018) and others (Coppieters 2018; Caspersen 2018; Axyonova and Gawrich 2018; Kyris 2018) call “engagement without recognition”—when third-party states trade or cooperate with “de facto” states without recognition—is an advanced form of latent sovereignty. Unlike recognition, latent sovereignty is continuous as a concept.…”

Section: Current Understandingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…And rebel groups who are moderately strong—not considered weak or strong—are the most likely to receive aid from third parties (Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham 2011). When aspiring states do reach “de facto” status, 2 third-party states engage them to foster economic and political stability, all the while refusing recognition (Ker-Lindsay and Berg 2018; Coppieters 2018; Caspersen 2018; Axyonova and Gawrich 2018; Kyris 2018). 3…”

Section: Current Understandingmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Foulweather Friends: Violence and Third Party Support in Self-Determination Conflicts

Huddleston

2021

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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This paper investigates how violence in self-determination conflicts influences bilateral foreign policy. I argue that a general preference for international stability causes third parties to support self-determination groups when violence reaches high levels, when they gain territorial control, and when major powers officially recognize. In these conditions, third parties perceive a stable new status quo to be nigh: unrecognized statehood. Ongoing instability encourages foreign policy that encourages the development of the de facto state, even when third parties have no intention of recognizing them as states. Importantly, I also show that targeting civilians erodes third-party support of the perpetrating side. I demonstrate these relationships using a latent variable model of international sovereignty of aspiring states, built on bilateral military, diplomatic, and economic exchange data. My model and tests provide new insight into how aspiring state actors become increasingly eligible for recognition through the tacit support of third-party states.

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Section: Current Understandingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Current Understandingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Foulweather Friends: Violence and Third Party Support in Self-Determination Conflicts

Huddleston

2021

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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“…As mentioned above, the issue of contested statehood and its implications (and consequencesintended or unintended) for EU engagement has remained underresearched. Some scholars have focused on so-called "engagement without recognition" (Cooley and Mitchell 2010;Caspersen 2015;Ker-Lindsay 2015;Ker-Lindsay and Berg 2018). EU studies scholars have focused on the impact of integration and association Diez et al 2008), how domestic actors of contested states understand the EU (Vahl andEmerson 2004, Popescu 2007) and how their representatives interact with it (Bouris and Fernandez Molina 2018), diplomatic issues (Papadimitriou and Petrov 2012), and the EU's state-building efforts but without taking into account the specific parameter of contested statehood (Bieber 2011;Börzel 2011;Bouris 2014).…”

Section: Enter Contested Statehoodmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unintended Consequences of State-building Projects in Contested States: The EU in Palestine

Bouris

2019

The International Spectator

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The existing literature on state-building has focused mainly on post-conflict cases and 'conventional' examples of statehood, without taking into consideration the particularities of states that remain internally and/or externally contested. The EU's engagement in Palestinian state-building through the deployment of EUPOL COPPS and EUBAM Rafah has generated various types of unintended consequences: anticipated and unanticipated, positive and negative, desirable and undesirable, some of which fulfill and some of which frustrate the initial intention. These have important reverberations for the EU's conflict resolution strategies in Israel and Palestine, the most important being the strengthening of power imbalances and the enforcement of the status quo.

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“…As mentioned above, there is a growing literature that examines various key aspects of contested polities ranging from the nature and level of contestation (Berg & Kuusk, 2010;Geldenhuys, 2009;Caspersen & Stansfield, 2011;Florea, 2014), via international engagement (Caspersen, 2009;Lynch, 2004;Pegg and Berg, 2016) to democratisation and legitimacy (Caspersen, 2011). A growing number of studies concern the intricacies of dealing with these entities in the absence of recognised sovereignty or 'engagement without recognition' (Cooley & Mitchell, 2010;Ker-Lindsay, 2015;Kyris, 2018;Berg & Pegg 2018;Ker-Lindsay & Berg, 2018) as well as on Europeanisation (Kyris, 2015;Bouris & Kyris 2017). The focus of these works has been on varying degrees of interaction and hybrid diplomacy with contested states, by both sovereign states and international organisations, without regarding them as independent actors.…”

Section: (Lack Of) Sovereignty and Citizenshipmentioning

confidence: 99%

Contested States as Liminal Spaces of Citizenship: Comparing Kosovo and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

Krasniqi

2019

Ethnopolitics

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Through a comparative analysis of two contested states-Kosovo and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), the paper analyses the impact of internal and/or external statehood contestation on the scope of citizenship rights. It does so by introducing the concept of liminality in the study of citizenship in contested states. It contends that while the negative impact of contested statehood on citizenship rights is inevitable, the degree of impediment depends on the nature and level of contestation of statehood, the wider (regional) citizenship constellations, and on the ability of contested states to use different strategies to overcome sovereignty deficits.

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Introduction: A Conceptual Framework for Engagement with de facto States

Cited by 67 publications

References 21 publications

Foulweather Friends: Violence and Third Party Support in Self-Determination Conflicts

Foulweather Friends: Violence and Third Party Support in Self-Determination Conflicts

Unintended Consequences of State-building Projects in Contested States: The EU in Palestine

Contested States as Liminal Spaces of Citizenship: Comparing Kosovo and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

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