Introduction

Bottani, Andrea Clemente Maria

doi:10.1111/j.1746-8361.2005.01036.x

Cited by 1 publication

(3 citation statements)

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“…Why on earth should such a natural, pervasive and uncontroversial phenomenon be treated as a philosophical paradox? (Bottani 2005, 381)…”

Section: The Problem With the Puzzle Of Changementioning

confidence: 99%

“…What about having distinct properties at distinct times does look impossible or at least odd, and why? (Bottani 2005, 382)…”

Section: The Problem With the Puzzle Of Changementioning

confidence: 99%

“…(1) Longhair = Shorthair (2) Longhair has long hair 1 Bottani's (2005) preferred statement of the puzzle is ultimately a generalization of this case.…”

Section: The Problem With the Puzzle Of Changementioning

confidence: 99%

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There is No Puzzle about Change

Rychter

2009

Dialectica

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This paper argues against the common practice of presenting perdurantism, endurantism, and other views about persistence and time as solutions to an alleged puzzle about change. Different recent attempts to generate a puzzle about change are examined and found unsuccessful. This does not mean, however, that the relevant views about persistence and time are not well motivated, but rather that their interest and purpose is independent of their suitability for solving the alleged puzzle.In the contemporary literature on persistence through time, it is customary to present particular versions of endurantism and perdurantism (as well as other theories of persistence, as I will generically call them) as primarily intended to solve a certain puzzle about change. More generally, the idea that change is a deeply puzzling phenomenon is a common assumption among philosophers: how can one and the same object have incompatible properties? Nothing can have incompatible properties at the same time; how does having them at different times help? I will argue, however, that contrary to what is so generally assumed, there is no real puzzle about change -at least not one that could serve as a motivation for theories of persistence. Moreover, the pretension that there is such a puzzle can hardly be justified on heuristic grounds, as a useful means for presenting or motivating the different theories of persistence. As I will argue, this pretension is rather pernicious, since it obscures some actual motivations for theories of persistence. I want to emphasize at the outset that by undermining this standard way in which theories of persistence are motivated, I do not intend to dismiss these theories, or to belittle their interest. On the contrary, my argument is perfectly compatible with the view that theories of

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“…Why on earth should such a natural, pervasive and uncontroversial phenomenon be treated as a philosophical paradox? (Bottani 2005, 381)…”

Section: The Problem With the Puzzle Of Changementioning

confidence: 99%

“…What about having distinct properties at distinct times does look impossible or at least odd, and why? (Bottani 2005, 382)…”

Section: The Problem With the Puzzle Of Changementioning

confidence: 99%