Introduction

Bacin, Stefano; Sensen, Oliver

doi:10.1017/9781316863435.001

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Although Ypi focuses on reason’s legislative function, she does not mention that the term ‘legislation’ is ambiguous in the first Critique , since it can indicate both the production of a law and its imposition as binding (Timmermann 2018: 103). Legislation in both these senses is necessary for moral autonomy.…”

Section: Reason’s Legislationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Constructing Reason

Møller

2023

Kantian rev.

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In The Architectonic of Reason, Lea Ypi provides an illuminating and innovative interpretation of the Architectonic in the first Critique. Ypi argues that Kant’s project of uniting practical and theoretical uses of reason in a critical metaphysics ultimately fails because practical reason does not have its own domain in which to legislate. This article challenges Ypi’s objection to practical reason’s lack of a domain in the first Critique. Its main contention is that reason’s need for unity in legislation may be satisfied by a belief in God as a necessary practical presupposition rather than a dogmatic metaphysical reality.

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Section: Reason’s Legislationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…4For an excellent account of Kant’s gradual development of moral autonomy, see Bacin and Sensen (2018). …”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Constructing Reason

Møller

2023

Kantian rev.

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Kant on Autonomy and Freedom

Allais

2024

The Oxford Handbook of Kant

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This chapter presents a unified reading of the metaphysical, moral, and political parts of Kant’s account of human free agency: the transcendental idea of a spontaneous causal power, the normative idea of acting under reason’s highest principle, and the political idea of acting for oneself rather than being under the control of another agent. It argues that Kant understands our freedom as a involving a spontaneous causal power that is engaged under the non-optional commitment to reason’s highest principle, and that this principle further commits us to realizing the conditions under which we can all act for ourselves. It evaluates each part of his position in relation to the idea of robust alternative possibilities, and argue that his account requires what is now called leeway freedom. The chapter argues against two main reasons that have been taken as reasons for thinking that his account does not require leeway: the idea that God lacks leeway and the idea that freedom is not lawless. Kant sees moral blame as requiring the possibility that you could have acted other than you did, and sees our recognition of moral claims as involving the awareness that we can act on them or not act on them. The chapter argues that this requires that at the point of action more than one course of action is available to the agent and therefore that action is not a nomologically determined function of previous states of the universe. Rather, we have the causal power to bring about one thing or another, though we cannot positively characterize this causal power in metaphysical or theoretical terms. Our freedom is understood positively in terms of the idea of acting under reason’s highest principle, and we act under reason’s highest principle both when we act in accordance with what it requires and when we act against this.

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Kant-Bibliographie 2018

Ruffing

2020

Kant-Studien

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Introduction

Cited by 3 publications

References 87 publications

Constructing Reason

Constructing Reason

Kant on Autonomy and Freedom

Kant-Bibliographie 2018

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