2010
DOI: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00414.x
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Intrinsicality and Hyperintensionality

Abstract: The standard counterexamples to David Lewis’s account of intrinsicality involve two sorts of properties: identity properties and necessary properties. Proponents of the account have attempted to deflect these counterexamples in a number of ways. This paper argues that none of these moves are legitimate. Furthermore, this paper argues that no account along the lines of Lewis’s can succeed, for an adequate account of intrinsicality must be sensitive to hyperintensional distinctions among properties.

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Cited by 35 publications
(23 citation statements)
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References 29 publications
(50 reference statements)
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“…We need states to be intrinsic. In the current debate about intrinsic properties, however, no real consensus has been reached; see, e.g., Langton and Lewis (1998) and Eddon (2011). Considerations of the relativity of simultaneity may raise further worries in connection with the requirement of having to specify a global Now to make sense of a 'current state of the world'.…”
Section: Determinism and Indeterminismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We need states to be intrinsic. In the current debate about intrinsic properties, however, no real consensus has been reached; see, e.g., Langton and Lewis (1998) and Eddon (2011). Considerations of the relativity of simultaneity may raise further worries in connection with the requirement of having to specify a global Now to make sense of a 'current state of the world'.…”
Section: Determinism and Indeterminismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Cf (Marshall 2012, p. 535). 27 This objection has been discussed by a number of philosophers including Sider (1996) and Eddon (2011). The objection also applies to a number of other accounts of intrinsicality, including Langton and Lewis (1998), Lewis (2001), Weatherson (2001), and Rosen (2010).…”
Section: Notesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“… The problem of hyperintensionality for Lewis's duplication-based account (Eddon 2011) also relies on exclusivity and primacy, and the responses Eddon considers (and counters) include fiddling with LEM and minimizing the flaw. The problem of hyperintensionality (for Lewis) is that (a) if one individuates properties in terms of sets of possible individuals, and (b) if one holds that duplicates are worldbound individuals, then one will not be able to distinguish intrinsic from extrinsic necessary properties or intrinsic from extrinsic identity properties.…”
Section: The Standard I/e Distinctionmentioning
confidence: 99%