Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control

Hitching a ride: omnibus legislating in the U.S. Congress

“…Three key tactics are (1) the ordering of alternatives in committee and on the floor; (2) in the House, the use of closed rules limiting the acceptance of amendments once the legislation leaves the committee; and (3) the unifi cation of diverse measures within a single large bill, or omnibus legislating. While significant bodies of literature exist on leadership use of the order ing of alternatives (Bach 1990;Baron and Ferejohn 1989;Denzau and Mackay 1983;McKelvey 1976;Romer and Rosenthal 1978;Wilkerson 1990) and the closed rule (Bach 1981(Bach , 1990Bach and Smith 1988;Baron 1991;Baron and Ferejohn 1989;Beth 1994;Binder 1997;Dion 1997;Dion and Huber 1996;Fiorina 1987;Schickler and Rich 1997;Sinclair 1995;Weingast 1989), we have next to no systematic studies of the omnibus strategy.…”

Intellectual foundations of public choice, the forest from the trees

“…For example, Plott (1967) characterized general symmetry conditions for voter preferences that are sufficient for the existence of a median or moderate voter equilibrium under majority rule. McKelvey (1976) demonstrated that a person who controls the sequence of alternatives brought before a committee or legislature potentially can reach any policy outcome he or she wants under majority rule when voter preferences do not satisfy the Plott conditions. The effects of rational ignorance were linked to the older idea of fiscal illusion and possible mistakes associated with majoritarian outcomes by Wagner (1976) and others.…”

Governo e Oposição no Senado Brasileiro (1989-2010)

“…Quando estamos diante de um plano com mais de uma dimensão, a mesma previsibilidade que temos em espaços unidimensionais desaparece, o caos se instaura e tudo pode acontecer (McKelvey, 1976 (1991)(1992), o modelo unidimensional classificou corretamente 87,0% das votações, e 89,3% para a 103 a legislatura (1993)(1994).…”