Intervening on the Causal Exclusion Problem for Integrated Information Theory

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) intends to provide a principled theoretical approach able to characterize consciousness both quantitatively and qualitatively. By starting off identifying the fundamental properties of experience itself, IIT develops a formal framework that relates those properties to the physical substratum of consciousness. One of the central features of ITT is the role that information plays in the theory. On the one hand, one of the self-evident truths about consciousness is that it is informative. On the other hand, mechanisms and systems of mechanics can contribute to consciousness only if they specify systems' intrinsic information. In this paper, we will conceptually analyze the notion of information underlying ITT. Following previous work on the matter, we will particularly argue that information within ITT should be understood in the light of a causal-manipulabilist view of information (López and Lombardi 2018), conforming to which information is an entity that must be involved in causal links in order to be precisely defined. Those causal links are brought to light by means of interventionist procedures following Woodward's and Pearl's version of the manipulability theories of causation.

Section: Information and Causation In Iitmentioning

confidence: 95%

Section: Information and Causation In Iitmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Information and Causation In Iitmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

What Does ‘Information’ Mean in Integrated Information Theory?

Lombardi

López

2018

“…For instance, the axiomatic approach of IIT has been critically examined [ 5 ]. In addition, several methods by which to articulate the notion of information in IIT have been suggested [ 17 , 18 , 19 ]. Further, many efforts have been made with regard to empirical applications of IIT.…”

Section: From Phenomenology To Ontology: How the Exclusion Axiom Lmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exclusion and Underdetermined Qualia

Moon

2019

Integrated information theory (IIT) asserts that both the level and the quality of consciousness can be explained by the ability of physical systems to integrate information. Although the scientific content and empirical prospects of IIT have attracted interest, this paper focuses on another aspect of IIT, its unique theoretical structure, which relates the phenomenological axioms with the ontological postulates. In particular, the relationship between the exclusion axiom and the exclusion postulate is unclear. Moreover, the exclusion postulate leads to a serious problem in IIT: the quale underdetermination problem. Therefore, in this paper, I will explore answers to the following three questions: (1) how does the exclusion axiom lead to the exclusion postulate? (2) How does the exclusion postulate cause the qualia underdetermination problem? (3) Is there a solution to this problem? I will provide proposals and arguments for each question. If successful, IIT can be confirmed with respect to, not only its theoretical foundation, but also its practical application.

“…My contribution is to explicitly focus on the philosophical issues concerning mental causation, and to address the topic from the perspective of contemporary philosophy of mind (cf. [ 13 ]). The aim is to help clarify which philosophical commitments IIT theorists might make, and which mental causation problems will correspondingly arise, and how they might or might not be overcome.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Causal Efficacy of Consciousness

Owen

2020

Mental causation is vitally important to the integrated information theory (IIT), which says consciousness exists since it is causally efficacious. While it might not be directly apparent, metaphysical commitments have consequential entailments concerning the causal efficacy of consciousness. Commitments regarding the ontology of consciousness and the nature of causation determine which problem(s) a view of consciousness faces with respect to mental causation. Analysis of mental causation in contemporary philosophy of mind has brought several problems to the fore: the alleged lack of psychophysical laws, the causal exclusion problem, and the causal pairing problem. This article surveys the threat each problem poses to IIT based on the different metaphysical commitments IIT theorists might make. Distinctions are made between what I call reductive IIT, non-reductive IIT, and non-physicalist IIT, each of which make differing metaphysical commitments regarding the ontology of consciousness and nature of causation. Subsequently, each problem pertaining to mental causation is presented and its threat, or lack thereof, to each version of IIT is considered. While the lack of psychophysical laws appears unthreatening for all versions, reductive IIT and non-reductive IIT are seriously threatened by the exclusion problem, and it is difficult to see how they could overcome it while maintaining a commitment to the causal closure principle. Yet, non-physicalist IIT denies the principle but is therefore threatened by the pairing problem, to which I have elsewhere provided a response that is briefly outlined here. This problem also threatens non-reductive IIT, but unlike non-physicalist IIT it lacks an evident response. The ultimate aim of this survey is to provide a roadmap for IIT theorists through the maze of mental causation, by clarifying which commitments lead to which problems, and how they might or might not be overcome. Such a survey can aid IIT theorists as they further develop and hone the metaphysical commitments of IIT.