Interpreting across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy

The methodology of comparative history of political thought

“…This is a radically historicist approach, based on the idea that philosophy itself is highly contingent and based on circumstances peculiar to the West. 30 Rorty seems to insist that any comparison is so deeply situated in its own culturally bound conceptual scheme that any attempt at comparison can be neither useful nor neutral. He seems particularly dismissive of the content of non-Western thought when he rejects Davidson's approach to understanding language that all humans hold true beliefs about those same things 31 by saying that Davidson's argument holds only for whole natural languages, not for "specialized jargons," 32 which presumably prohibits access to the meaningful content of non-Western thought.…”

“…30 Rorty seems to insist that any comparison is so deeply situated in its own culturally bound conceptual scheme that any attempt at comparison can be neither useful nor neutral. He seems particularly dismissive of the content of non-Western thought when he rejects Davidson's approach to understanding language that all humans hold true beliefs about those same things 31 by saying that Davidson's argument holds only for whole natural languages, not for "specialized jargons," 32 which presumably prohibits access to the meaningful content of non-Western thought. James Tartaglia points out that this is not consistent with Rorty's overall orientation, which is more open-minded as accepting of dialogue and suggests that he was forced to take this position because the possibility of comparative political thought undermines his argument that philosophy is culturally specific and thus Rorty's pragmatism.…”

A Cross-Cultural Approach to the Interpretation of Buddhist Philosophy

“…- Raju, 1983Raju, , 1985Raju, , 1997Allen, 1997;Clarke, 1997;Gregor, 1984;Matilal, 1991;Parkes, 1987;Rorty, 1989;Krauz, 1989…”

Rorty’s Thesis of the Cultural Specificity of Philosophy

“…(ibid. : 317) Given the central importance he placed in dialogue between independent discourses, then, it does seem frankly amazing that in his few explicit statements on dialogue with non-Western philosophy (Rorty 1989, Rorty 1991, Balslev 1991), Rorty's attitude was almost entirely dismissive. He seemed sure such conversation could not be useful, thought it would almost inevitably involve fundamental misunderstanding, and even went so far as to wonder whether non-Western philosophy exists, saying he found it 'perfectly reasonable to ask, without condescension and in honest bewilderment, the question (…): 'Is There Philosophy in Asia?'…”