Interplay between Security Providers, Consumers, and Attackers: A Weighted Congestion Game Approach

Maillé, Patrick; Reichl, Peter; Tuffin, Bruno

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-25280-8_8

Cited by 9 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Congestion games have been applied in the field of networking to account for security aspects [8], link congestion [6] and pricing of infrastructures and users [4]. In [5], the authors study Bitcoin as a congestion game, where the congestion occurs due to an increase in the number of transaction requests from users.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mining competition in a multi-cryptocurrency ecosystem at the network edge

Altman

Reiffers

Menasché

et al. 2019

SIGMETRICS Perform. Eval. Rev.

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We model the competition over several blockchains characterizing multiple cryptocurrencies as a non-cooperative game. Then, we specialize our results to two instances of the general game, showing properties of the Nash equilibrium. In particular, leveraging results about congestion games, we establish the existence of pure Nash equilibria and provide efficient algorithms for finding such equilibria.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mining competition in a multi-cryptocurrency ecosystem at the network edge

Altman

Reiffers

Menasché

et al. 2019

SIGMETRICS Perform. Eval. Rev.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Congestion games have been applied in the field of networking to account for security aspects (Maillé et al, 2011), link congestion (Johari and Tsitsiklis, 2003) and pricing of infrastructures and users (Hassin and Haviv, 1997). In Huberman et al (2017), the authors study Bitcoin as a congestion game, where the congestion occurs due to an increase in the number of transaction requests from users.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Blockchain Competition Between Miners: A Game Theoretic Perspective

et al. 2020

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We model the competition over mining resources and over several cryptocurrencies as a non-cooperative game. Leveraging results about congestion games, we establish conditions for the existence of pure Nash equilibria and provide efficient algorithms for finding such equilibria. We account for multiple system models, varying according to the way that mining resources are allocated and shared and according to the granularity at which mining puzzle complexity is adjusted. When constraints on resources are included, the resulting game is a constrained resource allocation game for which we characterize a normalized Nash equilibrium. Under the proposed models, we provide structural properties of the corresponding types of equilibrium, e.g., establishing conditions under which at most two mining infrastructures will be active or under which no miners will have incentives to mine a given cryptocurrency.

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“…Maille et al [53] have also studied network externalities related to security countermeasures, but without accounting for epidemic aspects. Their focus is on financial and economic motivations behind malicious actions, assuming that the number of vulnerable devices is directly proportional to the incentives an attacker has to produce an exploit for that vulnerability.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond Herd Immunity Against Strategic Attackers

et al. 2020

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Herd immunity, one of the most fundamental concepts in network epidemics, occurs when a large fraction of the population of devices is immune against a virus or malware. The few individuals who have not taken countermeasures against the threat are assumed to have very low chances of infection, as they are indirectly protected by the rest of the devices in the network. Although very fundamental, herd immunity does not account for strategic attackers scanning the network for vulnerable nodes. In face of such attackers, nodes who linger vulnerable in the network become easy targets, compromising cybersecurity. In this paper, we propose an analytical model which allows us to capture the impact of countermeasures against attackers when both endogenous as well as exogenous infections coexist. Using the proposed model, we show that a diverse set of potential attacks produces non-trivial equilibria, some of which go counter to herd immunity; e.g., our model suggests that nodes should adopt countermeasures even when the remainder of the nodes has already decided to do so. INDEX TERMS Cybersecurity, denial-of-service attacks, network epidemics, network security.

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Interplay between Security Providers, Consumers, and Attackers: A Weighted Congestion Game Approach

Cited by 9 publications

References 27 publications

Mining competition in a multi-cryptocurrency ecosystem at the network edge

Mining competition in a multi-cryptocurrency ecosystem at the network edge

Blockchain Competition Between Miners: A Game Theoretic Perspective

Beyond Herd Immunity Against Strategic Attackers

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