Interorganizational Coordination and Collaboration During the 2015 MERS-CoV Response in South Korea

Abstract

Objectives: This study examined the way organizations were involved in the response to the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-CoV, MERS) outbreak that occurred in Korea in 2015. Data and Methods: We collected organizational network data through a content analysis of online news articles and the government’s white paper. Social network analysis was used to analyze the key organizations and their connections in crucial response tasks. Results: Three national health authorities (Central MERS Management Headquarters [CMMH], Korea Centers for Disease Control [KCDC], Ministry of Health and Welfare [MOHW]) led the response. CMMH, which did not appear in the government’s response plans, played a significant role in all 3 networks. KCDC also was involved in all 3 networks, but was most prominent in the laboratory testing network. MOHW appeared only in the patient management network. Each health authority coordinated and collaborated with distinctive types of organizations in the networks, but unclear lines of responsibilities also were found. Conclusions: The study demonstrated that the roles and responsibilities of health authorities at the national level were fragmented and lacked clarity. Public health emergency preparedness must consider carefully the way to establish collaborative response systems.

How lessons learned from the 2015 Middle East respiratory syndrome outbreak affected the response to coronavirus disease 2019 in the Republic of Korea

“…There was a lack of functioning EID management systems. The responsibilities and roles of health authorities at the national level were fragmented and lacked clarity [ 34 ]. In addition, there was a lack of hierarchical communication between different levels of government, horizontal cooperation, and collaboration between agencies [ 35 ].…”

Effectiveness of Emergent Ad Hoc Coordination Groups in Public Health Emergencies

“…From a national planning perspective, the Infectious Disease Crisis Management Standard Manual that the MOHW (2014) prepared defines the infectious disease emergency management system. According to the Standard Manual (Korea Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2014), the health authorities, MOHW or KCDC, are expected to guide and lead the response, depending upon public health risk alert levels: blue (the lowest risk alert; attention is needed), yellow (a disease broke out in the country), orange (the disease has spread to communities), and red (the highest risk alert: a national emergency) (Kim, Oh, Ku, & Byeon, 2020).…”

From Uncoordinated Patchworks to a Coordinated System: MERS-CoV to COVID-19 in Korea

“…Together with the CMMH, the MOHW and KCDC were also involved in the response throughout the crisis (Y. Kim et al, 2020). This could have confused other response organizations with respect to understanding the ICS at the national level.…”

“…Kim, Ku, & Oh, 2019). According to the Standard Manual, different central government agencies can establish crisis response headquarters within their organizations (that serve as an ICS), depending upon the crisis levels: Blue indicates disease cases abroad with no immediate threat of import to the country; Yellow, the domestic import of the disease from abroad; Orange, the confined spread of the disease within the country; and Red, the spread of the disease in communities throughout the country (Y. Kim et al, 2020).…”

“…However, the CMMH was unable to address the collaboration and coordination problems, communication breakdowns, and conflicts among government agencies sufficiently or effectively. Together with the CMMH, the MOHW and KCDC were also involved in the response throughout the crisis (Y. Kim et al, 2020).…”