Interoperable device identification in Smart-Grid environments

Policy enforcement system for secure interoperable control in distributed Smart Grid systems

“…Finally it is left to say that our approach differs from Majdalawieh et al (2007), Cheung et al (2008), Kuntze et al (2011), Honeywell International (2012, Rosic et al (2013), and Veichtlbauer et al (2013) in several aspects. Firstly, the majority of existing approaches (Cheung et al, 2008;Honeywell International, 2012;Rosic et al, 2013;Veichtlbauer et al, 2013) base their interoperability level on the decisions of each control centre without looking at, for example, the accessibility level of a determined demanding context/region as stated in Kapsalis et al (2006).…”

“…), type of organisational hierarchy, …) but discard the possibility of following specific security standards, which can help ensure a better interoperability and sustainability of the system. Likewise, the automation during the authorisation process is not always guaranteed where the policy decision points generally depend on each organisation (Cheung et al, 2008), instead of being shared by a group of organisations (e.g., SCADA 1 -SCADA 2 -Providers, Kuntze et al, 2011). This criterion is also sustained by Lang andSchreiner (2012) andNIST 7628 (2013).…”

“…This way of subdividing Smart Grid areas into regions is also considered by Rosic et al (2013) to propose a RBAC-based access control mechanism dependent on the area of responsibility. Regarding policy enforcement and interoperability in Smart Grid environments, Kuntze et al (2011) propose the use of smart energy gateways to establish trust relationships between parties (the energy grid, the control system and the customer side) using asymmetric key cryptography and cryptographic hash functions. Similarly, Veichtlbauer et al (2013) provide a middle-ware architecture based on RBAC and policy decision and enforcement points to collect data streams from multiple sources connected to the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) in a standardised format.…”

Custom Transport Interface for the Integration of Trusted Network Connect in German Smart Metering Systems

“…This could lead to a so called Trusted Grid, where different components in a Smart Grid evaluate each other, like it is already the case for the so called Trusted Core Network 2 developed by the Fraunhofer Institute for Secure Information Technology in Germany. In this context, the custom transport interface might also be used 2 https://www.sit.fraunhofer.de/en/tcn/ to apply the TNC based device identification approach for so called Smart Energy Gateways described by [22] in a German Smart Metering System. Additionally, the evaluation results generated with TNC can be incorporated into a monitoring system for the Smart Grid, to create an overview of the grid integrity for example.…”

Design and Simulation of NFC-Based M2M Payment Model for Mobile Phone With Trusted Platform Module

“…Some researchers (Kuntze, Rudolph, Bente, Vieweg, & Helden, 2011) show that a substantial number of vulnerabilities, both known and unknown to the client can alter the industrial software practices. Majority of threats that affect computing systems do so through servers and networks because users are not keen to update the patches due to time consuming.…”