Interoperability analysis of IEC61850 protocol using an emulated IED in a HIL microgrid testbed

Hemmati, Marziyeh; Palahalli, Harshavardhan; Gruosso, Giambattista; Grillo, Samuele

doi:10.1109/smartgridcomm51999.2021.9632327

Cited by 8 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…In this work, the testbed grid is selected based on the power system network presented previously in [4]. However, nominal values are modified for the test scenarios presented here.…”

Section: Implementation and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The nominal voltage of the grid is 120 kV and the working frequency 50 Hz, there are three constant power loads present in the base grid that consume 700 kW in total and two Diesel Generators (DG) whose nominal parameters are presented in table 1; the two DGs provide 600 kW of the total power while the rest is delivered from the slack node in bus13. The general design details related to the components used and the software memory assigned to each subsystem in the grid modeling are also given in [4]. The ratio of the internal transformer is 10…”

Section: Implementation and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…3. Initially, the circuit breakers (CBs) on line (3)(4) are in the closed position, and the circuit breaker on line (2)(3) is in the open position so that bus3 is powered by bus4. The circuit breakers receive the trip command and status from their corresponding IEDs via a hardwired cable from the input terminals of the HIL device, and the IEDs receive the measurement signals via the Ethernet port from the MUs implemented in the microgrid.…”

Section: A First Scenariomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the event of a fault in line (3)(4), only IED1, which corresponds to CB1, would detect the short-circuit current and respond to this short-circuit by issuing a trip command for instantaneous short-circuit protection. At the same time, CB2 is still in the closed position and supplies Bus3 via the other redundant lines, so that the fault continues to be supplied with power and can cause further damage to the network components.…”

Section: A First Scenariomentioning

confidence: 99%

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Impact and Vulnerability Analysis of IEC61850 in Smartgrids Using Multiple HIL Real-Time Testbeds

et al. 2022

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Due to the increasing use of smart components in smart grids, interoperability among them is a crucial aspect to address. IEC61850 is a communication standard that has been already used in substations because of its instant data transfer and the ability to enable data exchange between a variety of smart energyrelated digital technologies. This article studies the application of the communication protocols defined by the IEC61850 standard in Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) by using a prototype testbed architecture running on a real-time digital device. The goal of this activity is to study the impact of smart simulations and the vulnerability in terms of cyber-security. This testbed includes the supervisor, the substation bus, and the process bus communication layer creating a local network exchanging data at distinct levels. Different fault protection scenarios are discussed using both physical and emulated IEDs, and the communication protocols implemented in each scenario are explained showing that additional delays are introduced. In the first two scenarios, the operation of the testbed using physical versus emulated IEDs is analyzed and compared, ensuring the robustness of this methodology in situations where the use of a physical IED would be unfeasible. In these scenarios, the functionality and robustness of the protection mechanisms and communication protocols are confirmed. In the third scenario vulnerability of smart grids that use IEC61850 as their primary communication protocol to data injection attacks is studied. Sniffing the local network, packets are captured and monitored. Spoofed data with the same structure are injected into the network to conduct false data injection attacks on the supervisory unit. Vulnerability to cyber attacks of the IEC61850 protocol in specific situations is shown.

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“…In this work, the testbed grid is selected based on the power system network presented previously in [4]. However, nominal values are modified for the test scenarios presented here.…”

Section: Implementation and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Implementation and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A First Scenariomentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A First Scenariomentioning

confidence: 99%

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Impact and Vulnerability Analysis of IEC61850 in Smartgrids Using Multiple HIL Real-Time Testbeds

et al. 2022

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“…In [21], the authors presented the common functional testing of IEDs, the authors also emphasized the significance of IEC 61850based SAS integrated system testing. In [22] the authors investigated the compatibility of the IEC61850 protocol in a HIL Microgrid testbed using an emulated IED and identified issues related to GOOSE message configuration and data types. The study identified issues related to GOOSE message configuration, such as the inconsistent use of data types and the incorrect mapping of signals.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interoperability Challenges in Multivendor IEC 61850 Devices for Parallel Power Transformer Differential Protection

Shangase

2024

IJEETC

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Interoperability of GOOSE messages is essential for the proper operation of protection schemes such as the parallel power transformer (PTRF) differential protection scheme, especially when using multivendor IEC 61850 devices. GOOSE messages allow for fast and reliable communication between intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) and are based on Ethernet communication. To ensure the interoperability of GOOSE messages between multivendor devices, adherence to the IEC 61850 standard specifications is crucial. The standard defines the format and content of GOOSE messages, including the data object model, data types, and communication protocols. Third-party testing and certification programs can also ensure compliance with the standard and help guarantee interoperability between different vendors. Device conformance with these standards does not ensure interoperability when devices from various manufacturers are utilized. Interoperability is necessary between the relevant devices from various vendors to provide system power stability and protection. If multivendor device interoperability is achieved, power utilities will be able to utilize multivendor devices in substations. The study investigates and provides comprehensive methods for achieving IEC 61850 standard-based interoperability problems in parallel with PTRF’s current differential protection schemes between IEDs (SEL-487E and MiCOM-P645) produced by different vendors under fault conditions. In a lab-scale environment with RTDS for real-time simulation in Hardware-in-the-Loop (HIL), the designed technique is simulated and tested.

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Intelligent Auxiliary Control System Interoperability Test Framework for Smart Substation with Communication Interference

Zhan,

Feng,

Zheng

2024

Lecture Notes in Electrical Engineering

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Interoperability analysis of IEC61850 protocol using an emulated IED in a HIL microgrid testbed

Cited by 8 publications

References 11 publications

Impact and Vulnerability Analysis of IEC61850 in Smartgrids Using Multiple HIL Real-Time Testbeds

Impact and Vulnerability Analysis of IEC61850 in Smartgrids Using Multiple HIL Real-Time Testbeds

Interoperability Challenges in Multivendor IEC 61850 Devices for Parallel Power Transformer Differential Protection

Intelligent Auxiliary Control System Interoperability Test Framework for Smart Substation with Communication Interference

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