2002
DOI: 10.17487/rfc3280
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Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile

Abstract: Status of this Memo This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

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Cited by 766 publications
(375 citation statements)
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“…It provides a mutual authentication and symmetric key exchange for creating a symmetric secure channel). It uses x509 certificates [8] and RSA (Rivest Shamir Adleman) algorithm [15]. The authentication requires a trustful third parties.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…It provides a mutual authentication and symmetric key exchange for creating a symmetric secure channel). It uses x509 certificates [8] and RSA (Rivest Shamir Adleman) algorithm [15]. The authentication requires a trustful third parties.…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Along with the partitioned choreography, the relevant service descriptions and public key certificates of participants that need to interact (including the VO manager's) are distributed. Service descriptions are Web Service Description Language (WSDL) documents, while certificates are X.509v3 [9]. (4) As shown in Figure 2 each participant resource provider has a policy generator PG installed.…”
Section: Interactions and Data Structuresmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The SubjectAltName in the certificate received from a relay MUST match the hostname part of the URI, and the certificate MUST be valid according to RFC 3280 [12], including having a date that is valid and being signed by an acceptable certification authority. After validating that such is the case, the device that initiated the TLS connection can assume that it has connected to the correct relay.…”
Section: Msrp Relays September 2007mentioning
confidence: 99%