Internet routing instability

Labovitz, Craig; Malan, G.R.; Jahanian, Farnam

doi:10.1109/90.731185

Cited by 305 publications

(71 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…A change in BGP import policies, such as ltering a route advertisement or assigning di erent l ocal preference values, would change the set of egress links associated with this destination pre x. Similarly, network failures, policy changes in other domains, and even network congestion could result in uctuations in the BGP reachability information 11,12]. These intentional and unintentional changes would result in a new tra c demand.…”

Section: Traffic-engineering Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deriving traffic demands for operational IP networks: methodology and experience

Feldmann¹,

Greenberg

Lund

et al. 2001

IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking

397

351

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Engineering a large IP backbone network without an accurate, network-wide view of the tra c demands is challenging. Shifts in user behavior, changes in routing policies, and failures of network elements can result in signi cant (and sudden) uctuations in load. In this paper, we present a model of tra c demands to support tra c engineering and performance debugging of large Internet Service Provider networks. By de ning a tra c demand as a volume of load originating from an ingress link and destined to a set of egress links, we can capture and predict how routing a ects the tra c traveling between domains. To infer the tra c demands, we propose a measurement methodology that combines ow-level measurements collected at all ingress links with reachability information about all egress links. We d i scuss how to cope with situations where practical considerations limit the amount and quality of the necessary data. Speci cally, we show how to infer interdomain tra c demands using measurements collected at a smaller number of edge links | the peering links connecting to neighboring providers. We report on our experiences in deriving the tra c demands in the AT&T IP Backbone, by collecting, validating, and joining very large and diverse sets of usage, con guration, and routing data over extended periods of time. The paper concludes with a preliminary analysis of the observed dynamics of the tra c demands and a discussion of the practical implications for tra c engineering.

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Section: Traffic-engineering Applicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Deriving traffic demands for operational IP networks: methodology and experience

Feldmann¹,

Greenberg

Lund

et al. 2001

IEEE/ACM Trans. Networking

397

351

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…The heavy reliance on such mission critical applications has played a vital role in motivating the increased interest in improving the security of the Internet. BGP has always been an interesting topic for the research community mainly due to several concerns related to its convergence [2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10], its churn [11][12][13], its limitations in terms of traffic engineering [14][15][16][17], policies [18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25], documented anomalies [26][27][28][29][30][31], and other issues [32][33][34][35][36][37][38][39][40], but the recent large scale outages in the Internet acted as a catalyst for reviving the research focus toward its security [41][42][43][44][45][46][47][48]...…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A survey on the recent efforts of the Internet Standardization Body for securing inter-domain routing

et al. 2015

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The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is the de-facto inter-domain routing protocol in the Internet, thus it plays a crucial role in current communications. Unfortunately, it was conceived without any internal security mechanism, and hence is prone to a number of vulnerabilities and attacks that can result in large scale outages in the Internet. In light of this, securing BGP has been an active research area since its adoption. Several security strategies, ranging from a complete replacement of the protocol up to the addition of new features in it were proposed, but only minor tweaks have found the pathway to be adopted. More recently, the IETF Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) Working Group (WG) has put forward several recommendations to secure BGP. In this paper, we survey the efforts of the SIDR WG including, the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI), Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs), and BGP Security (BGPSEC), for securing the BGP protocol. We also discuss the post SIDR inter-domain routing unresolved security challenges along with the deployment and adoption challenges of SIDR's proposals. Furthermore, we shed light on future research directions in managing the broader security issues in inter-domain routing. The paper is targeted to readers from the academic and industrial communities that are not only interested in an updated article accounting for the recent developments made by the Internet standardization body toward securing BGP (i.e., by the IETF), but also for an analytical discussion about their pros and cons, including promising research lines as well.

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“…Transitions from stability to instability are manifest in the Internet, which makes it a suitable prototype case for studying the dynamical properties of high dimensional systems [11,21,30,32,36]. A central function of the Internet is to enable any node to communicate with any other node transparently and without significant delays or lost communication.…”

Section: Internet2mentioning

confidence: 99%

Vulnerability Analysis of High Dimensional Complex Systems

Misra

Harmon

Bar‐Yam

2010

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. Complex systems experience dramatic changes in behavior and can undergo transitions from functional to dysfunctional states. An unstable system is prone to dysfunctional collective cascades that result from self-reinforcing behaviors within the system. Because many human and technological civilian and military systems today are complex systems, understanding their susceptibility to collective failure is a critical problem. Understanding vulnerability in complex systems requires an approach that characterizes the coupled behaviors at multiple scales of cascading failures. We used neuromorphic methods, which are modeled on the pattern-recognition circuitry of the brain and can find patterns in high-dimensional data at multiple scales, to develop a procedure for identifying the vulnerabilities of complex systems. This procedure was tested on microdynamic Internet2 network data. The result was a generic pipeline for identifying extreme events in high dimensional datasets.

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Internet routing instability

Cited by 305 publications

References 18 publications

Deriving traffic demands for operational IP networks: methodology and experience

Deriving traffic demands for operational IP networks: methodology and experience

A survey on the recent efforts of the Internet Standardization Body for securing inter-domain routing

Vulnerability Analysis of High Dimensional Complex Systems

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