International Trials and Reconciliation

Postwar Justice in Bosnia and Herzegovina

“…The similarity of findings across research studies seems to imply that people’s perceptions of the ICTY are closely linked with their ethnicity (see, e.g., Clark, 2014; Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2008; Klarin, 2004; Klarin, 2009; Kutnjak Ivković & Hagan, 2011). Klarin (2004, p. 553) reasoned that “Statistically speaking, the Tribunal’s popularity in the former Yugoslavia is inversely proportionate to the number of accused that come from the countries, entities and, particularly, ethnic communities concerned.” A study of the ICTY cases completed by 2005 (Kutnjak Ivković & Hagan, 2011, p. 23) clearly supports this view.…”

“…Studies conducted in the former Yugoslavia uniformly suggest that the ICTY does not enjoy a high degree of support among its constituency (e.g., Arzt, 2006; Biro et al, 2004; Gallup Balkan Monitor, 2008; Clark, 2014; Human Rights Center, 2000; Kutnjak Ivković & Hagan, 2011; 2016; Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE), 2009; Orentlicher, 2010; Saxon, 2005; Stover, 2005; Stover & Weinstein, 2004). In 2002, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2002) conducted one of the most comprehensive studies that showed how much support for the ICTY varied across the former Yugoslavia.…”

“…Whereas the ICTY may have been viewed by the Muslim/Bosniak victims, including Hodžić’s respondents from the Prijedor region (2010, p. 120), as the omnipotent “beacon of justice” in the early period, the political discourse and the ICTY’s decisions seemed to weaken that (positive) opinion (see also Clark, 2014). The initial support for the ICTY gradually melted away because of the relatively limited number of prosecutions and convictions (e.g., Ramulić, 2011), the perceived leniency of sentences (Clark, 2014; Hodžić, 2011), the withdrawal of indictments, and the introduction of guilty pleas (Clark, 2014; Hodžić, 2011). One of the critical components of the support for the ICTY across all ethnic groups (Muslims/Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) seems to be the way in which they perceive the ICTY treatment of defendants and victims from “their” ethnic group (Clark, 2014).…”

“…The initial support for the ICTY gradually melted away because of the relatively limited number of prosecutions and convictions (e.g., Ramulić, 2011), the perceived leniency of sentences (Clark, 2014; Hodžić, 2011), the withdrawal of indictments, and the introduction of guilty pleas (Clark, 2014; Hodžić, 2011). One of the critical components of the support for the ICTY across all ethnic groups (Muslims/Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) seems to be the way in which they perceive the ICTY treatment of defendants and victims from “their” ethnic group (Clark, 2014). In a few studies (Clark, 2014; Stover, 2005), scholars provided a number of examples in which ICTY’s acquittals and lenient sentences in the specific cases of defendants from the respondents’ communities directly led to the respondents’ dramatic decrease in the level of support for the ICTY.…”

“…One of the critical components of the support for the ICTY across all ethnic groups (Muslims/Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs) seems to be the way in which they perceive the ICTY treatment of defendants and victims from “their” ethnic group (Clark, 2014). In a few studies (Clark, 2014; Stover, 2005), scholars provided a number of examples in which ICTY’s acquittals and lenient sentences in the specific cases of defendants from the respondents’ communities directly led to the respondents’ dramatic decrease in the level of support for the ICTY.…”