International Third Parties and the Implementation of Comprehensive Peace Agreements After Civil War

Abstract

Comprehensive peace agreements (CPAs) are the most impactful negotiated settlements ending civil wars, but their implementation varies across post-conflict countries and over time. To explain varying implementation, this study identifies central challenges in CPA implementation and suggests that international third parties are uniquely positioned to overcome them. (1) IGOs with high economic leverage, and (2) prior foreign aid both set incentives that reduce domestic barriers to implementation. Quantitative evidence on the implementation of CPAs from 1989-2015 supports this argument. Both post-conflict countries’ participation in IGOs with high economic leverage and higher volumes of prior foreign aid are associated with higher rates of CPA implementation. Multiple estimation approaches, including instrumental variables, support this finding. Case evidence from the 2007 CPA in Ivory Coast tracks the processes by which IGOs and donors help overcome stakeholder resistance and facilitate implementation. This finding encourages more concerted efforts by policymakers to advance CPA implementation.

The unexpected results of the peace referendum changed conflict termination preferences in Colombia

“…At the same time, pursuing negotiated peace can also be a costly effort. Parties to the conflict need to sort how power ought to be shared (Mukherjee, 2006), what concessions to give (Matanock and Garbiras-Díaz, 2018), whether to accept external parties to ensure implementation (Karreth et al, 2023), amongst others. These costs can also influence civilian support for negotiated peace, which could explain why some civilians would choose not to support negotiations.…”

How International Actors Help Enforce Domestic Deals

“…Instead, outside the Goldilocks condition, these international actors typically have incentives to ignore their preferred partners' violations of domestic bargains, affecting their willingness to use their leverage. Outsiders' strong economic and even strategic interestsincluding trading partnerships providing needed natural resources, protection of major foreign business properties, or, as noted above, partnerships combating common security threats-can thus make threats to punish government violations of domestic political bargains less credible (e.g., Carothers 1999, p. 45;Girod 2012Girod , 2018Hafner-Burton et al 2019;Karreth et al 2019;Nielsen 2014;von Borzyskowski & Vabulas 2019). 21 The factors that shape these ties, and even that motivate intervention, are beyond the scope of this review but are an important and related topic (see Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2012).…”