International Organisations and Peace Enforcement

Coleman, Katharina P.

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511491290

Cited by 107 publications

(16 citation statements)

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“…With Rwanda having admitted that it was involved, the Kinshasa Government secured SADC's military assistance (Coleman 2007). The Kinshasa Government started cultivating its relations with Hutu exiles and refugees and its already provocative anti-Tutsi rhetoric reached incendiary levels of intensity.…”

Section: Managing the Interstate Spoilersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managing Spoilers in a Hybrid War: The Democratic Republic of Congo (1996–2010)

Fuamba

Yonekawa

Seegers³

2013

Politikon

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Scholarship on the management of spoilers in a hybrid type of conflict is almost non-existent. Through an examination of the recent Congolese wars and peace efforts (1996)(1997)(1998)(1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007)(2008)(2009)(2010), we develop an understanding of how spoilers are managed in a conflict characterised by both interstate and intrastate dynamics. Certainly, more strategies of dealing with spoiler behaviours in this type of conflict are likely to emerge as similar cases are investigated, but our discussion recommends these non-related, but strongly interacting principles: the practice of inclusivity, usually preferred in the management of spoilers, is more complex, and in fact ineffective, particularly when concerned groups' internal politics and supportive alliances are unconventional. Because holding elections is often deemed indispensable in peacemaking efforts, it is vital that total spoilers be prevented from winning or disrupting them. The toughest challenge is the protection of civilians, especially when the state lacks a monopoly on the use of violence and governance remains partitioned across the country.

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Section: Managing the Interstate Spoilersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Managing Spoilers in a Hybrid War: The Democratic Republic of Congo (1996–2010)

Fuamba

Yonekawa

Seegers³

2013

Politikon

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“…This originally emblematic third-generation operation-which initially controversially went ahead without the endorsement of the Security Council and later served as the basis for a fourth-generation peace operation that is still ongoing-highlights an important characteristic of the carrying-out of peace enforcement missions. Many, if not most, of such missions are carried out not by troops seconded to the UN itself, but by regional organizations or coalitions of the willing authorized under Chapter VIII of the Charter (see Coleman 2007). This is true of the intervention in Kosovo, which is often seen as the quintessential peace enforcement mission, as well as the Australian-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) in 1999.…”

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confidence: 99%

Five generations of peace operations: from the "thin blue line" to "painting a country blue"

Kenkel

2013

Rev. bras. polít. int.

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This article combines both international practice and analytical contributions into a systematic and synthetic presentation of the evolution of peace operations from their modern inception in 1948 to the present. It seeks to serve a didactic purpose in proposing a basic structure for Brazilian scholars' burgeoning debate on peace operations and intervention, rather than a definitive characterization of blue helmet practice. Peace operations' progression is traced through five analytical "generations," each adding a crucial factor distinguishing it from its predecessors. Each generation is placed in relation to changes in the nature of conflict and in the interpretation of the foundational principles of peace operations, and links to broader theoretical issues in International Relations are made explicit at each stage.

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“…85 However the UK, US, Spain and Bulgaria argued diplomatic processes, including inspections, had been exhausted by Iraq's non-compliance. 86 The Council was therefore divided on this question, however the more widely held view, especially amongst decision making Council members, was that inspections and political processes were working but needed time.…”

Section: Last Resortmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…85 United Nations Security Council 27 th March 2003 S/Pv.4726 (Resumption 1), France 28-19, Russia 27-28, China 28, Germany 5. 86 United Nations Security Council. 27 th March 2003 S/Pv.4726 (Resumption 1), Bulgaria 31. be handed over to the inspection agencies for investigation.…”

Section: Last Resortmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However a unique feature of this case was that non-forceful political processes had barely begun and remained incomplete when the use of force was authorised. The AU had 86 United Nations Security Council, 17 March 2011 S/Pv.6498, Portugal 8. "expectation that the relevant requirements contained in the unanimously adopted resolution 1970 must be rapidly and fully fulfilled by the Libyan authorities" noting, "this has not happened yet." 87 The regime's failure to comply with Resolution 1970 was evidence of Qaddafi's failure to genuinely participate in a political process to find a peaceful solution.…”

Section: Last Resortmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Mind the gap: contestations of legality, legitimacy and the use of force in international politics

Frater¹

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Despite the ubiquity of the languages of legality and legitimacy in international relations, seldom do we address the gaps that can emerge between them. Hard cases involving the legality of the use of force seem to fall through the gaps, perhaps demonstrated best by the vague label placed on the Kosovo intervention, 'illegal but legitimate'. These cases are often treated as exceptions to the rule or anomalies which demonstrate at best the inadequacy of existing laws to deal with conflicts between legal regimes, or at worst the powerlessness of institutions in a system of powerful states. This dissertation examines the contestations between states over the use of force question in Rwanda, Kosovo, Libya and Iraq, noting that although states offered many of the same arguments to support their actions in each case, these claims received very different responses. Many point to these inconsistencies and argue the contestations and justifications offered to legitimise these actions and decisions are mere rhetoric. They equate this casuistry with sophistry and dismiss its value.However this dissertation disputes these assumptions, arguing the process of legitimation is more complex. It includes not only the role of central actors, but also audience members, some of whom attain higher positions of legitimacy as audience reframers. I argue that as central actors cast their contestations in terms which emphasise their own absolute legitimacy and legality, it is the frames of audience members and audience reframers in particular that blur the lines between legality and legitimacy and add this extra layer of complexity to the legitimation process. As these actors engage in the process of contestation they may themselves rhetorically entrap or rhetorically exclude other actors or their frames, or may be the entrapped or excluded themselves. This suggests not only that legality and legitimacy are not synonymous, but also that these two forms of language can be used as conjoined or oppositional concepts by states seeking to justify their actions to an international audience that exceeds what could be perceived as 'mere rhetoric'. This process is itself a vital aspect of understanding institutional processes in international relations.The goal of this dissertation is therefore not to trace the emergence or acceptance of new normative principles or their interpretations, but rather to trace the nuances of this process of legitimation to prove not only its ubiquity in these cases, but also its influence. Realist approaches that deny the viability of law and argue that states apply logics of consequence in these contestations are capable of explaining an individual actor's self-interested motivations in isolated instances. But understanding the legitimation process offers a more holistic understanding of the cases, the actors, their claims and the responses to these. This makes the legitimation process not only ubiquitous in these cases, but demonstrates the presence of normative expectations that are constitutive of and co...

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International Organisations and Peace Enforcement

Cited by 107 publications

References 0 publications

Managing Spoilers in a Hybrid War: The Democratic Republic of Congo (1996–2010)

Managing Spoilers in a Hybrid War: The Democratic Republic of Congo (1996–2010)

Five generations of peace operations: from the "thin blue line" to "painting a country blue"

Mind the gap: contestations of legality, legitimacy and the use of force in international politics

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