International institutions and the new economics of organization

Abstract

The institutional and organizational questions that once defined political economy are now widely perceived as belonging to social sciences other than economics. But the centuries-long movement of economics away from institutional concerns has recently been interrupted. Most highly developed in its analysis of the firm, the "new economics of organization" (NEO) is notable for its range and scope, encompassing literature on the family, the state, and international relations. 1 The contributions, while diverse in per-We are grateful to seminar participants at McGill and Columbia Universities for helpful comments, to Dick Nelson for drawing our attention to the Hodgson book, to Oliver Williamson for clarifying several points, and to Joanne Gowa, Steve Krasner, and two anonymous referees. 1. Subsets of and alternative names for the new economics of organization include the new institutional economics, transaction cost economics, and the economics of property rights. Examples of NEO treatments of various institutions include the following: Robert A.

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