2012
DOI: 10.1080/21599165.2012.715581
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International administration and institutional autonomy in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo

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Cited by 6 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as the protectorate body for Kosovo (1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007)(2008), had expansive authority, but neglected to reconcile the two warring Albanian factions. It thus undermined the legitimacy of the interim Kosovar government, perpetuated instability (Mulaj, 2011;van Willigen, 2012), and led to the promotion of parallel, Serbian institutions, thereby solidifying ethnic tensions rather than diffusing them (Narten, 2009). Ultimately these conditions slowed political and economic development, particularly capacity building, and impeded the transfer of responsibilities to domestic actors and institutions (Mulaj, 2011).…”
Section: Incentivized Liberal Reforms and International Protectorates...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) as the protectorate body for Kosovo (1999)(2000)(2001)(2002)(2003)(2004)(2005)(2006)(2007)(2008), had expansive authority, but neglected to reconcile the two warring Albanian factions. It thus undermined the legitimacy of the interim Kosovar government, perpetuated instability (Mulaj, 2011;van Willigen, 2012), and led to the promotion of parallel, Serbian institutions, thereby solidifying ethnic tensions rather than diffusing them (Narten, 2009). Ultimately these conditions slowed political and economic development, particularly capacity building, and impeded the transfer of responsibilities to domestic actors and institutions (Mulaj, 2011).…”
Section: Incentivized Liberal Reforms and International Protectorates...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…UNMIK's deployment in 1999 followed the NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia, making it initially difficult for Kosovo Serbs to accept it (interview #18, Northern Mitrovica, July 23, 2015). Moreover, on the one hand UNMIK kept tight control over the political processes in Kosovo (it could override every decision of Kosovar elected self-government), but, on the other, despite its broad powers it had a mixed record in improving both the rule of law and the economic conditions (Van Willigen, 2012). This triggered the feeling of powerlessness, particularly on the Albanian side, and made the Kosovars blame UNMIK for Kosovo's bleak situation.…”
Section: Eulex Kosovo: Background and Deploymentmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…While elections were held regularly (in 2001, 2004, and 2007), the quasi-government did not have any significant power, and UNMIK could override each of its decisions (Hehir, 2006). At the same time, UNMIK was unsuccessful in improving both the rule of law and the economic conditions for the population (van Willigen, 2012). This created growing frustration and a sense of powerlessness, particularly among the Albanian population (Hehir, 2006;Kosovar Center for Security Studies, 2010).…”
Section: Pre-independence Periodmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…UNMIK's deployment in 1999 followed the NATO's bombing of Yugoslavia, making it initially difficult for Serbs to accept it (Interviewee 18). Moreover, on the one hand UNMIK kept tight control over the political processes in Kosovo (it could override every decision of Kosovar elected self-government), but, on the other, despite its broad powers it had a mixed record in improving both the rule of law and the economic conditions (van Willigen, 2012). This triggered the feeling of powerlessness, particularly on the Albanian side, and made the Kosovars blame UNMIK for Kosovo's bleak situation.…”
Section: Eulex Kosovo: Background and Deploymentmentioning
confidence: 99%