Internalism and the Problem of Stored Beliefs

Abstract

A belief is stored if it is in no way before the subject's mind. The problem of stored beliefs is that of satisfactorily explaining how the stored beliefs which seem justified are indeed justified. In this paper I challenge the two main internalist attempts to solve this problem. Internalism about epistemic justification, at a minimum, states that one's mental life alone determines what one is justified in believing. First I dispute the attempt from epistemic conservatism, which states that believing justifies retaining belief. Then I defend the attempt from dispositionalism, which assigns a justifying role to dispositions, from some key objections. But by drawing on cognitive psychological research I show that, for internalism, the problem of stored beliefs remains.

Against overconfidence: arguing for the accessibility of memorial justification

“…39 37 Using the taxonomy first developed by Squire (2009), episodic memory differs from propositional memory insofar as the former has experiences or events as its content, whereas the latter has propositions as its content. 38 By drawing on the same literature, Frise (2018) argues that the problem of stored belief is a pseudoproblem since there aren't any stored beliefs. 39 It has long been argued that episodic memory is characterized by one or more special phenomenological properties [see, e.g., Hume (1739/2011), Russell (1921), Tulving (2002) and Dokic (2014)].…”

Metacognition As Evidence for Evidentialism

“…But the relevant process in ordinary retrieval cases is one that produces a belief by significantly altering the contents of its inputs, including its belief inputs. Memory alters these inputs considerably at three stages, and this often results in changes in truth-value (see Frise (2018) and Michaelian (2011)). Yet the alteration helps memory yield true beliefs.…”

“…Frise (2017). For replies see Frise (2015Frise ( , 2018 and Conee and Feldman (2001). 8 Proust's arguments, for example, have influenced Koriat andAdiv (2012: 1611).…”

The Role of Memory in Agential Self-Knowledge

“…This procedure is significant, agentialists claim, because in the paradigmatic case, at least, it involves deploying one's rational capacities in the service of answering a question about what one believes: in the paradigmatic case, I answer the question whether I believe that p by considering the reasons for and against p. 2 It seems, however, that not every instance in which one employs the transparency procedure is one in which one must consider the reasons that bear on the relevant first-order question. Consider, for instance, one's stored beliefs-those beliefs which are in no way before one's mind (Frise 2017). I can come to know that I believe that p, say, where my belief that p is stored, by employing the transparency procedure-by answering the first-order question whether p. But it's not the case that my answering that question necessarily involves me considering the reasons for and against p. In cases where I have a stored belief that p, I can answer the question whether p simply by remembering that p. And I can remember that p without rehearsing the considerations which speak in favor of p or that initially convinced me that p. It's plausible that exercising one's capacity for deliberating on the first-order considerations is the way one comes to know that one believes that p, where the belief that p is formed on the basis of the present exercise of that very capacity-on the basis of present consideration of the reasons for and against p. But it's not at all clear that one must exercise that capacity in order to know that one believes that p, where the belief that p is stored.…”