Internal and External Factors in Effecting Third World Military Expenditures

Looney, Robert E.

doi:10.1177/0022343389026001004

Cited by 21 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…A smaller literature focuses on developing countries, which are our primary interest. Deger and Somnath (1991) survey this literature which uses a cross‐sectional approach (see, for example, Maizels and Nissanke, 1986; Looney, 1989; Gyimah‐Brempong, 1989). The dependent variable is the ratio of military spending to GDP, commonly referred to as the ‘defence burden’.…”

Section: Modelling Military Expenditurementioning

confidence: 99%

Unintended Consequences: Does Aid Promote Arms Races?*

Collier¹,

Hoeffler²

2006

Oxf Bull Econ Stat

176

129

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Using global data for the period 1960-99, we model military expenditure. Neighbours' military spending and development aid are important determinants of military expenditure. An implication of the model is that there are regional arms races which are fuelled by aid. Potentially, aid is encouraging a 'regional public bad'. There may, however, be an offsetting public good effect if military spending deters rebellions. In a simultaneous equation model, we find no deterrence effect of spending on the risk of civil war. Hence, there appears to be no regional public good effect offsetting the public bad arising from a neighbourhood arms race. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Section: Modelling Military Expenditurementioning

confidence: 99%

Unintended Consequences: Does Aid Promote Arms Races?*

Collier¹,

Hoeffler²

2006

Oxf Bull Econ Stat

176

129

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Recent empirical studies (Looney, 1989Looney and liehay, 1990) have confirmed the importance of economic variLbles in structuring budgetary allocations to the military. One •ariant of this approach stresses the significance of Military Ceynesianism-the use of military expenditures as a counter· yclical tool.…”

Section: Review Of the Literaturementioning

confidence: 97%

Defense Expenditures and Economic Performance in South Asia: Tests of Causality and Interdependence

Looney

1991

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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“…Rather, this environment is only one of several influences shaping a defense budget, and its effects are filtered or mediated by organizational protocols, institutional processes, a ruling coalition's agenda, and the conditions of the domestic political economy (Cusack and Ward, 1981;Eichenberg, 1992;Harris, 1986;Looney, 1989;Marra, 1985;Ostrom, 1978Ostrom, , 1977Ostrom and Marra, 1986;Rattinger, 1975;Rosh, 1990Rosh, , 1988. Rather, this environment is only one of several influences shaping a defense budget, and its effects are filtered or mediated by organizational protocols, institutional processes, a ruling coalition's agenda, and the conditions of the domestic political economy (Cusack and Ward, 1981;Eichenberg, 1992;Harris, 1986;Looney, 1989;Marra, 1985;Ostrom, 1978Ostrom, , 1977Ostrom and Marra, 1986;Rattinger, 1975;Rosh, 1990Rosh, , 1988.…”

Section: Model Of Arms Races Among Rival Nations Without Modificatiomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Many studies have shown that defense spending is motivated or constrained by factors other than security concerns (Chan, 1988b;Harris, 1986;Hartley and Sandler, 1990;Looney, 1989;Looney and Frederiksen, 1987;Mintz and Russett, 1992;Mintz and Ward, 1989;Moon and Hyun, 1992;Palmer, 1990;Treddenick, 1985;Ward and Mahajan, 1984). Some have argued that this spending is used as a fiscal stimulus to offset economic downturns, or as a political lever to rally electoral support.…”

Section: Domestic Sources and Consequences Of Defense Spendingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Grasping the Peace Dividend: Some Propositions on the Conversion of Swords into Plowshares

Chan¹

1995

Mershon International Studies Review

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JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.. Wiley and The International Studies Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Mershon International Studies Review. This review discusses the likely size, pace, and distribution of reductions in defense spending and the possible barriers to converting military resources to civilian purposes. It argues that the prospects for a peace dividend in the aftermath of the Cold War are clouded by political incentives and economic interests that may oppose or retard significant military retrenchment. Moreover, the resource savings from any military retrenchment may not necessarily be reallocated fully and efficiently to produce gains in civilian production and productivity. Any such gains are apt to take some time to materialize, whereas the political costs and socioeconomic disruption caused by lower military expenditures are likely to be felt more immediately. The impacts of a defense cutback, both positive and negative, will be uneven across industries, occupations, regions, and ethnic and income groups, so that some will bear more of the adjustment costs while others will reap more of the ensuing benefits. Indeed, given their different social institutions, political cultures, and economic structures, different countries are likely to pursue alternative policy offsets that accompany any defense cutback, thus resulting in an uneven distribution of the peace dividend globally.This essay attends to the ramifications of a possible military "build-down." Drawing on the pertinent literature, it seeks to address the following questions.1. What are the prospects for and likely size of the so-called peace dividend to be realized from a fall in military expenditures? 2. What are the likely domestic redistributive consequences of a defense cutback? 3. What are the likely economic consequences of unilateral or multilateral arms reduction for the United States and its traded sectors?Before proceeding, each of these questions requires some clarification. The first question refers to a process that has often been popularly described, but poorly *This essay is a significantly revised and expanded version of an earlier paper, coauthored with Henrik Sommer, that was presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington, D. C., March 29-April 1, 1994. I thank Robert B. Woyach for his detailed comments that were very helpful in producing this version. ? 1995 TheGrasping the Peace Dividend specified, as converting swords into plowshares. This process actually involves at least two steps: military expenditures are cut to generate nontrivial savings (a resource dividend), which are, in turn, applied to promote greater production efficien...

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Internal and External Factors in Effecting Third World Military Expenditures

Cited by 21 publications

References 26 publications

Unintended Consequences: Does Aid Promote Arms Races?*

Unintended Consequences: Does Aid Promote Arms Races?*

Defense Expenditures and Economic Performance in South Asia: Tests of Causality and Interdependence

Grasping the Peace Dividend: Some Propositions on the Conversion of Swords into Plowshares

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