Intergroup cooperation and intergroup attraction: The effect of previous interaction and outcome of combined effort

Worchel, Stephen; Andreoli, Virginia; Folger, Robert

doi:10.1016/s0022-1031(77)80006-1

Cited by 109 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Some empirical research has shown that individuals in groups under stress tend to transfer responsibility or yield control more to other members (particularly those higher in a status hierarchy). Worchel, Andreoli, and Folger (1977) found that members of competing groups identified fewer members as leaders than did members of cooperating groups, suggesting a centralization of authority under stress. Klein (1976) found that, under certain conditions, group members attributed more responsibility to leaders when under stress.…”

Section: Stress and Group Decision Makingmentioning

confidence: 96%

Group decision making under stress.

Driskell¹,

Salas²

1991

Journal of Applied Psychology

216

142

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Understanding the processes by which task groups function is a major concern of social psychologists who study small groups. Equally important to the applied group researcher is the understanding of how group processes are altered by the external environment. Research suggests that organizations respond to stress with a centralization of authority so that decision making becomes concentrated in the higher levels of an organizational hierarchy. In this study, this hypothesis was extended to the small-group level of analysis, and the effects of stress on group status and decision making were examined. Experimental results clarify and delimit the centralization-of-authority hypothesis: Rather than centralizing authority and decision making under stress, group leaders and group members become more receptive to information provided by others. Implications for group decision making are discussed.Modern complex and high-risk technologies are inherently contradictory. On one hand, they greatly extend the range of human potential; for example, military anti-air warfare (AAW) systems allow military personnel to "see" aircraft at great distances. On the other hand, these systems also increase the potential for catastrophic error; in an AAW environment, the amount and complexity of information that must be processed in a short period of time once a target has been identified is enormous. We note several characteristics of these high-technology systems: (a) They pervade the aerospace, military, petrochemical, and nuclear industries; (b) they involve complex tasks that usually require interdependent or team performance; (c) during emergency or crisis conditions, operators have to make critical decisions under extreme stress; and (d) operator error is usually cited as a primary cause of system failure (see Perrow, 1984). Thus, although the necessity for effective performance under stress has been present since our ancestors were first chased with a club, it is likely that modern systems have both increased the stress under which humans must perform, as well as the consequences of poor performance.The deleterious effects of stress on human performance are well documented and have been a focus of research in the social and behavioral sciences for a number of years. Numerous studies have demonstrated cognitive, behavioral, and emotional responses to stress at the individual level (Harris, 1981;Keinan, 1987;Taylor, Buunk, & Aspinwall, 1990). Considerably less is known about the effects of stress on group performance. This is particularly surprising for several reasons. First, the complexity and scope of modern-day tasks often require group efforts (see

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Section: Stress and Group Decision Makingmentioning

confidence: 96%

Group decision making under stress.

Driskell¹,

Salas²

1991

Journal of Applied Psychology

216

142

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“…The single most important factor appears to be institutional support: When authorities sanction the contact, it predicts success better than any other factor (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2006). It may also be essential that the groups achieve success in their cooperative endeavors (the positive-outcome condition in Allport's list), for failure enhances bias and scapegoating (Worchel, Andreoli, & Folger, 1977).…”

Section: Origin and Evolution Of The Contact Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

What Should This Fight Be Called?

Kruglanski

Crenshaw

Post

et al. 2007

Psychol Sci Public Interest

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SUMMARY-This monograph examines from a psychological perspective the use of metaphors in framing counterterrorism. Four major counterterrorism metaphors are considered, namely those of war, law enforcement, containment of a social epidemic, and a process of prejudice reduction.The war metaphor is as follows: Wars are fought by states; the enemy is thus an identifiable entity whose interests fundamentally oppose your own. The conflict is zero-sum-the outcome will be victory for one side or the other-and there is no compromise. The war metaphor is totalistic and extreme. Arguably, it was adopted in light of the immensity of damage and national hurt produced by the 9/11 attack. It has insinuated itself into the public discourse about counterterrorism, and it has guided policy, but it has also met challenges because of lack of fit and the availability of counteranalogies with different lessons of history.Some of the drawbacks of the war metaphor are addressable in the law enforcement metaphor of counterterrorism. Unlike war's special status and circumscribed duration, law enforcement is an ongoing concern that must compete for resources with other societal needs. A major advantage of law enforcement over warfare is its focused nature-targeting the actual terrorists, with less likelihood of injuring innocent parties. Yet despite its advantages, the law enforcement metaphor exhibits a partial mismatch with the realities of terrorism. Its complete and uncritical adoption may temporarily hamper terrorists' ability to launch attacks without substantially altering their motivation to do so.The public health epidemiological model was usefully applied to the epidemic of terror that followed the 9/11 attacks. It utilizes a partition between (a) an external agent, (b) a susceptible host, (c) an environment that brings them together, and (d) the vector that enables transmission of the disease. In the specific application to jihadist terrorism, the agent refers to the militant Islamist ideology, the susceptible host refers to radicalizable Muslim populations, the environment refers to conditions that promote the readiness to embrace such ideology, and the vectors are conduits whereby the ideology is propagated. The epidemiological metaphor has its own advantages over the war and law enforcement metaphors, but also limitations. Whereas the latter metaphors neglect the long-range process of ideological conversion and radicalization that creates terrorists, the epidemiological metaphor neglects the ''here and now'' of counterterrorism and the value of resolute strikes and intelligence-gathering activities needed to counter terrorists' concrete schemes and capabilities.Framing counterterrorism as the process of prejudice reduction addresses the interaction between two communities whose conflict may breed terrorism. This framing shifts the focus from a unilateral to a bilateral concern and acknowledges the contribution to intergroup tensions that the party targeted by terrorists may make. A major tool of prejudice reduction is the c...

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“…Several strategies were used to alter participants' conceptual representations of the aggregate as one group (high superordinate category salience), dual identity (high superordinate and subgroup category Merger performance and cognitive representations 417 salience) and two groups (high subgroup salience). The strategies were based on earlier studies conducted in this research tradition (e.g., Gaertner et al, 1989Gaertner et al, , 1990Gonzalez & Brown, 2003Worchel et al, 1977Worchel et al, , 1978 and are summarized in Table 2.Manipulation of Feedback Next, the first cooperative task began. It was a modified version of the Desert Survival Situation (Lafferty & Pond, 1974).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

United we win, divided we fail? Effects of cognitive merger representations and performance feedback on merging groups

Giessner

Mummendey

2007

Euro J Social Psych

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Research has shown that cognitive representations of mergers influence intergroup evaluations. This paper extends this research by studying how cognitive representations of mergers (one group, dual identity, and two groups) interact with performance feedback (success and failure) to affect intergroup evaluations. Two competing hypotheses were tested, which made different predictions in case of superordinate group salience combined with subgroup salience after merger failure: The subgroupsalience-hypothesis predicts that subgroup salience during a merger generally results in pre-merger ingroup bias toward the pre-merger outgroup (i.e., two groups and dual identity). The superordinatesalience-hypothesis predicts that subgroup salience only results in pre-merger ingroup bias if superordinate group salience is low (i.e., two groups). Both hypotheses predict low levels of ingroup bias after merger success. Study 1 confirmed the second hypothesis using a 3 (merger representation: one group, dual identity, and two groups) Â 2 (merger feedback: failure and success) design with interacting groups. Study 2 replicated the results in an adapted minimal group paradigm. Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Mergers between groups are an everyday occurrence in society. Organizational mergers have received a lot of research attention, indicating that this organizational change may create harmful behavioral and psychological reactions (Cartwright & Cooper, 1996;Hogan & Overmyer-Day, 1994). A substantial body of research on intergroup contact suggests that problems associated with intergroup cooperation can be overcome under certain conditions (Brewer & Brown, 1998). This research has shown its applicability to group mergers (Boen, Vanbeselaere, & Cool, 2006;Giessner, Viki, Otten, Terry, & Täuber, 2006;Haunschild, Moreland, & Murrell, 1994;Terry, 2001;van Knippenberg & van Leeuwen, 2001) and is also the foundation of the current research on mergers. Based on early ideas of important pre-conditions of positive intergroup contact (Allport, 1954), previous research on intergroup European Journal of Social Psychology Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 38, 412-435 (2008) cooperation has concentrated on the underlying cognitive representations of the involved groups to explain positive intergroup relations (Brewer & Miller, 1984;Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993;Hewstone & Brown, 1986). However, the influence that performance feedback has on relations between pre-merger groups remains a relatively neglected area of research. Does the group split after a common failure? How does the cognitive representation influence the handling of performance feedback of the merger? The aim of this research is to focus on the interactive effects of cognitive representation of mergers and performance feedback on the evaluations of the pre-merger groups.Group mergers can be defined as the combination of a group with another into one group (Gaertner, Bachman, Dovidio, & Banker, 2001). Hence, merging groups experience a situation in...

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Intergroup cooperation and intergroup attraction: The effect of previous interaction and outcome of combined effort

Cited by 109 publications

References 3 publications

Group decision making under stress.

Group decision making under stress.

What Should This Fight Be Called?

United we win, divided we fail? Effects of cognitive merger representations and performance feedback on merging groups

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