Intergroup Bias in Group Judgment Processes: The Role of Behavioral Memories

Abstract

Two experiments examined the role of memory for behavioral episodes in judgments about in-groups and out-groups. Using a minimal group paradigm, participants read either positive or negative trait-relevant behaviors performed by group members. They then were asked to make judgments about the group's trait characteristics. Results demonstrated that, for groups described positively, judgments about the out-group but not the in-group were accomplished by retrieving from memory specific behaviors performed by group members. In contrast, for groups described negatively, judgments about the in-group but not the out-group were accomplished by retrieving specific behaviors performed by group members. These results suggest that basic differences in the way judgments about in-groups and out-groups are made contribute to the establishment and perpetuation of intergroup bias by decreasing the stability of negative in-group and positive out-group impressions and increasing the stability of positive in-group and negative out-group impressions. 1998Academic Press

The unanticipated resilience of trait self-knowledge in the face of neural damage

“…In what follows we adopt the position that episodic and semantic memories are functionally independent. Episodic memories of a personal past clearly are a potential source of trait information about the self (e.g., Conway, 2005;Klein & Loftus, 1993a;Klein, Loftus, & Burton, 1989; as well as other persons, e.g., Babey, Queller, & Klein, 1998;Klein et al, 1992b;Sherman & Klein, 1994;Sherman, Klein, Laskey, & Wyer, 1998). It would be strange, however, if these were the only source of data about oneself.…”

The functional independence of trait self-knowledge: Commentary on Sakaki (2007)

“…This was not the case: When participants were asked to recall a specific behavioural incident in which they manifested a particular trait (recall task), those who had first made a self-descriptiveness judgement were no faster than those who had not (e.g., Klein & Loftus, 1990, 1993aKlein et al, 1989Klein et al, , 1992b). Yet the procedure used is known to be sensitive enough to detect episodic priming when it occurs (e.g., Babey, Queller, & Klein, 1998;Klein et al, 1992b;Sherman & Klein, 1994;Sherman, Klein, Laskey, & Wyer, 1998). (For experiments showing that this result obtains regardless of how ''central'' a trait is to one's self-concept, see, for example, Klein, Cosmides, Tooby, & Chance, 2001;Klein & Loftus, 1990, 1993aKlein et al, 1992b.…”

Stereotype efficiency reconsidered: Encoding flexibility under cognitive load.

“…We have also found evidence for these hypotheses in our own research. In two experiments, Sherman, Klein, Laskey, and Wyer (1998) showed that perceivers relied on episodic memory to differing degrees when they had learned stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent information about a target group. When the stimulus information confirmed participants' expectancies that in-groups would be positive and out-groups would be negative, judgments about the groups did not involve the activation of specific episodes.…”