Intergovernmental or supranational integration? A quantitative analysis of pension recommendations in the European Semester

Abstract

The European Semester, launched in 2011, enhances the coordination of macroeconomic policies among European Union member states. This article contributes to the lively scholarly debate on whether this policy-making cycle has empowered more the European supranational or intergovernmental institutions. Drawing on a new dataset covering all pension-related country-specific recommendations between 2011 and 2016, and employing an original quantitative method, we show that the Commission mainly follows a ‘technocratic’ approach in drafting its recommendations, which are grounded in objective indicators. As the Council refrains from systematically altering the recommendations’ logic, we conclude that, at least in pension policy, the Commission’s role in macroeconomic surveillance has been significantly strengthened in the aftermath of the Great Recession.

The Council’s Amendments to the Country-Specific Recommendations: More than just Cosmetics?

“…Therefore, the reform capacity of the Finnish government was taken into account, presuming that the government aimed at containing the political and social costs of this measure. The evidence about national ownership of policy reforms queries the argument that the Commission's (surveillance) influence increased after the 2011 governance reform (see Guidi and Guardiancich 2018 for exemplification of this argument specifically in the context of pension policy) and presents the Council as the dominant actor in the policy coordination process. However, one ought to inspect other cases and specific contexts of the design of the CSRs to test more effectively the relative weakening of the Commission.…”

The Post‐agencification Stage between Reforms and Crises. A Comparative Assessment of EU agencies' Budgetary Development

“…Many accounts support the view that in the post-Maastricht era EU elites need to 'look over their shoulder' before taking decisions (Hooge and Marks, 2009). As a consequence, responding to salient policy issues increasingly matters both for the Commission (Guidi and Guardiancich, 2018;Hartlapp et al, 2013;2014;Rauh, 2016Rauh, , 2018 and for the Council (Wratil, 2015(Wratil, , 2018 in the process of policy formulation and implementation. Given that agencies are part of the EU administration and take an active part in the policy implementation process, those dealing with policies that are deemed more salient at the EU level may be granted more resources than others.…”

The Politics of NDC Pension Scheme Diffusion

“…The single firm recommendation by the European Commission was the adoption of a specific ASM -that is, linking retirement age to life expectancy (European Commission 2011).In addition, the Council of the EU added the possibility of linking life expectancy to either retirement age or pension benefits, thereby increasing the palette of available options and, hence, of political room for maneuver to individual member states (Guidi and Guardiancich 2018).…”