Intergovernmental Grants and the Demand for Local Educational Expenditures

Addonizio, Michael F.

doi:10.1177/109114219101900205

Cited by 10 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 5 publications

(8 reference statements)

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“…So it appears that the grants were effective in both raising the level of school spending and reducing the disparity of spending across Connecticut. This contrasts vividly with the lack of equalization found previously in comparable studies by Park and Carroll (1979), Addonizio (1991), andHoxby (1998).…”

Section: Simulationcontrasting

confidence: 90%

The Median-Voter Model versus the Bureaucracy Model of School Finance Equalization Aid

Chandler

2005

Public Finance Review

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The median-voter and budget-maximizing bureaucracy models imply different effects from intergovernmental aid. In this article, the author uses data from an ambitious school district equalization program in Connecticut to test these models. Finding no clear winner in terms of explanatory power, he uses the results of both models to examine the impact of the equalization aid. The estimated models yield a mean price elasticity of public school expenditure of -0.39 and income elasticities of 0.49 and 0.57 for the median-voter and bureaucracy models, respectively. Simulations indicate that the Connecticut school finance equalization and Education Enhancement aid resulted in a reduction in the standard deviations of per pupil spending across districts of 29% to 33% and halved the standard deviation of net school mill rates.

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Section: Simulationcontrasting

confidence: 90%

The Median-Voter Model versus the Bureaucracy Model of School Finance Equalization Aid

Chandler

2005

Public Finance Review

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“…9 Low tax rates in Upstate large, urban districts contribute the low perpupil STAR tax savings given to those districts. Therefore and consistent with prior research, STAR acts much like a matching aid program in that more money goes to the districts with higher tax rates (Addonizio, 1990(Addonizio, , 1991. This implies, as pointed out by Oates (1972, p. 113), that state matching aid and the property tax relief program are equivalent in terms of their distributional mechanism; the more school districts want to spend (higher tax rates), the more they receive from the state.…”

Section: Distributional Benefits Of Starsupporting

confidence: 70%

Reconciling State Aid and Property Tax Relief for Urban Schools

Eom

Killeen

2007

Education and Urban Society

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Similar to many property tax relief programs, New York State's School Tax Relief (STAR) program has been shown to exacerbate school resource inequities across urban, suburban, and rural schools. STAR's inherent conflict with the wealth equalization policies of New York State's school finance system are highlighted in a manner that effectively penalizes large, urban school districts by not adjusting for factors likely to contribute to high property taxation. As a policy solution, this article presents results of a simulation that distributes property tax relief using an econometrically based cost index. The results substantially favor high-need urban and rural school districts.

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“…Many studies find that tax prices have a significant impact on the demand for local services. 1 Fisher (1988), Addonizio (1990Addonizio ( , 1991, and Rockoff (2003), explore the impact of property tax relief programs on school spending. The first two of these studies examine a circuitbreaker implemented in Michigan in the 1970s that altered tax prices.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Unintended Consequences of Property Tax Relief: New York’s STAR Program

2005

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New York's School Tax Relief Program, STAR, provides state-funded property tax relief for homeowners. Like a matching grant, STAR changes the price of public services, thereby altering the incentives of voters and school officials and leading to unintended consequences. Using data for New York State school districts before and after STAR was implemented, we find that STAR resulted in small increases in student performance along with significant decreases in the efficiency with which this performance is delivered and significant increases in school spending and property tax rates. These tax-rate increases magnify existing inequities in New York State's education finance system.

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Intergovernmental Grants and the Demand for Local Educational Expenditures

Cited by 10 publications

References 5 publications

The Median-Voter Model versus the Bureaucracy Model of School Finance Equalization Aid

The Median-Voter Model versus the Bureaucracy Model of School Finance Equalization Aid

Reconciling State Aid and Property Tax Relief for Urban Schools

Unintended Consequences of Property Tax Relief: New York’s STAR Program

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