Intergovernmental councils and centralization in Australian federalism

Phillimore, John; Fenna, Alan

doi:10.1080/13597566.2017.1389723

Cited by 18 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…Rather, it is an iterative development invariably characterised by complexity, contested choices, unexpected events and competing roles played by the actors of the day. 157 The centralisation tendencies of Australian federalism are evident 158 and recognised as such by this research. As Phillimore stated: 'State governments are part of a federation in which the Commonwealth government is fiscally dominant and has greatly expanded its policy ambition and reach over the past century.'…”

Section: Sustainable Uniformity As a Pragmatic Federalism Solutionmentioning

confidence: 61%

Categories of the ‘Art of the Impossible’: Achieving Sustainable Uniformity in Harmonised Legislation in the Australian Federation

Hill

2020

Federal Law Review

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National uniform legislation links the federal distribution of powers achieved more than 119 years ago with the challenges and opportunities faced by Australia in an interconnected world. Over this span of time, developing national uniform legislation has been described as the ‘art of the impossible’. The main objective of this article is to critically examine the database of national uniform legislation with a view to applying public policy and federalist theory to explain how sustainable uniformity has been achieved. Rather than focusing on why an individual set of uniform Acts has not achieved a high level of uniformity or has diverged through unilateral amendment, this article examines national uniform legislation by analysing the factors at play. This approach allows the common patterns impacting sustainable uniformity to be identified. From among 84 sets of uniform Acts, four discernible links with theory have been found: (1) the ‘incrementalism and policy cycle’ model—to explain harmonisation that may take decades (31 sets); (2) the ‘multiple streams’ framework, explaining legislation that emerges as sustainably uniform from the outset due to an ‘open policy window’ (16 sets); (3) ‘pragmatic federalism’ solutions, such as skeletal legislation and the conferral of powers, which are developed in the course of inter-jurisdictional negotiations when uniformity is required but is particularly difficult to achieve (14 sets); and (4) the ‘advocacy coalition’ framework, which in contrast, explains situations where jurisdictions hold firm views about retaining diversity (23 sets). Developing and drafting national uniform legislation can become the ‘art of the possible’ with this improved understanding.

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Section: Sustainable Uniformity As a Pragmatic Federalism Solutionmentioning

confidence: 61%

Categories of the ‘Art of the Impossible’: Achieving Sustainable Uniformity in Harmonised Legislation in the Australian Federation

Hill

2020

Federal Law Review

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“…Executive federalism is typically distinguished by the differences in intergovernmental financial arrangements where federal-parliamentary countries like Australia explicitly implement revenue-sharing and equalization arrangements from the national to and across state and territory governments as opposed to federal-presidential countries like the United States where revenue-sharing is conditional and program specific and there is no system of equalization between states (Watts, 1989). Executive federalism in Australia is expressed through a variety of formal and informal councils and conferences held annually or more frequently, numerous formal and informal agreements, policies and programs, and extensive contacts between officers and ministers in different governments (Phillimore & Fenna, 2017; Watts, 1989).…”

Section: Executive Federalism: a View From Abroadmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Executive federalism in the United States is much more transactional and politically driven where states are focused on securing influence and protecting their autonomy (Behnke & Mueller, 2017; Bowman, 2017). Australian states and territories are likewise motivated by policy influence and autonomy, but the emphasis on coordination and information sharing that derives from the repeated interactions between executive and ministerial authorities in a variety of intergovernmental forums acts to broaden and deepen the federal relationship between governments (Behnke & Mueller, 2017; Phillimore & Fenna, 2017).…”

Section: Executive Federalism: a View From Abroadmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This fiscal power has resulted in a distorted vertical fiscal imbalance (Fenna, 2008) that very much resembles coercive federalism (Kincaid, 1990). The Commonwealth now exercises influence (or control) over funding, laws, and policies across a range of policy areas originally assigned to the States (Phillimore & Fenna, 2017). However, the existence of an intergovernmental forum, such as COAG, demonstrates that the Commonwealth's dominance of the federal system is not complete and requires state cooperation to achieve some of its goals.…”

Section: Australian Response To Covid-19mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Federalism, Intergovernmental Relationships, and Emergency Response: A Comparison of Australia and the United States

Downey

Myers

2020

The American Review of Public Administration

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The recent COVID-19 pandemic has significantly disrupted governance. A strong intergovernmental response is critical for stemming the worst damage during the outset of a disaster. Collaborative planning with networks of constituent governments, medical experts, and emergency managers are needed to provide a holistic response to the highly technical and complex issues brought on by the novel coronavirus. This commentary highlights the differences in response by the United States and Australia, provides a comparison of intergovernmental relationships, and sheds light on how these federations vertical and horizontal collaborative efforts were stymied by politics or facilitated by existing intergovernmental forums.

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“…Most importantly, the NCP had to be negotiated through COAG and receive the endorsement and cooperation of the states and territories. Federalism was deeply implicated in the NCP and the policy was a key moment in Australian federalism (Painter 1998;Phillimore and Fenna 2017). One consequence of this was acceptance by the Commonwealth of the need to provide compensation payments to the states and territories (discussed below).…”

Section: Good Process?mentioning

confidence: 99%