Interest rate policy of the deutsche bundesbank: An econometric analysis for 1975 to 1992

Schächter, Andrea; Stokman, Ad

doi:10.1007/bf01384911

Cited by 10 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 2 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…However, also after a correction for endogeneity of cur< (see Boswijk, 1992, chapter 6.3.2)^, the coefficient remains insignificant. The lack of significance might be due to the fact that there has been a current account surplus for most of our sample, whereas earlier research (see among others Schàchter and Stokman, 1992) indicates much stronger results for a deficit than for a surplus. Moreover, as the influence of the current account on the desired interest rate policy might very well be different for different countries, we decide to drop the current account as an explanatory variable.…”

Section: Resultscontrasting

confidence: 58%

“…A current account deficit is expected to result in higher interest rates, in order to decrease demand and as such imports. Previous studies (see among others Schàchter and Stokman, 1992), found this variable to be of more importance than the basic balance. However, for our purpose there might be a problem with this variable as the interpretation of a current account deficit might be different for different countries.…”

Section: German Interest Rates and The European Monetary System 61 Introductionmentioning

confidence: 83%

“…publishes official targets for broad money (M3). However, the money supply is only an intermediate objective and in practice, policy has concentrated more on the final target, that is the inflation rate, than on the money supply (see Schàchter and Stokman, 1992). Moreover, since our objective is to translate the German reaction function to other ERM countries, the money supply might not be very suitable, since the velocity of money might be different for different countries.…”

Section: German Interest Rates and The European Monetary System 61 Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Exchange rates and risk premia within the European Monetary System

Vlaar¹

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication, or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page numbers. Link to publication General rightsCopyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the "Taverne" license above, please follow below link for the End User Agreement:

show abstract

Section: Resultscontrasting

confidence: 58%

Section: German Interest Rates and The European Monetary System 61 Introductionmentioning

confidence: 83%

Section: German Interest Rates and The European Monetary System 61 Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Exchange rates and risk premia within the European Monetary System

Vlaar¹

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Inflation has a marginal (and unexpectedly positive) effect on both government and opposition popularity. The latter might indicate that the electorate understands that the Bundesbank -which was highly independent and committed to its inflation target (Schächter and Stokman, 1995;Lohmann, 1998;Cusack, 1999) -rather than the government was to be held responsible for inflation.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The political cost of taxation: New evidence from German popularity ratings

Geys

Vermeir

2008

Electoral Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Previous studies indicate that higher tax burdens reduce incumbents' popularity and re-election odds. The present paper offers a new test of this relation for German data. Our findings indicate that taxation indeed negatively affects German federal government approval ratings, in line with previous international research. Nonetheless, the government's popularity losses do not necessarily translate into comparable gains in the opposition's popularity. In fact, the opposition may even lose support when there is 'divided government' (i.e. when it has some power over policies). Finally, we find some (albeit weak) evidence that the costs of taxation are limited to the tax burden imposed by the federal government and do not extend to taxes levied at lower levels of government. Terms of use: Documents in

show abstract

“…Yet, in practice, this distinction and these restrictions are largely hypothetical. Studies of the Bundesbank's reaction function (such as Clarida and Gertler, 1995;Muscatelli and Tirelli, 1996;Neumann, 1995;Schachter and Stokman, 1995) confirm that real as well as monetary variables help to explain its actions over recent years. Indeed, strikingly, actual and expected inflation and output gaps are often found to play a prominent explanatory role with money having, at best, a bit part.…”

Section: What Is New About Inflation-targeting?mentioning

confidence: 99%

On Inflation Targeting in the United Kingdom

Haldane

1998

Scottish J Political Eco

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper discusses some of the operational issues relevant to inflationtargeting in the United Kingdom, in particular: whether inflation targeting is 'new'; whether it is potentially destabilising; and whether it requires too much knowledge on the part of the authorities. It goes on to discuss the role of inflation forecasts in general, and inflation probability distributions in particular, in the context of inflation-targeting in the UK. It also discusses the role of transparency in such a regime, and provides some evidence on its effect.

show abstract

Interest rate policy of the deutsche bundesbank: An econometric analysis for 1975 to 1992

Cited by 10 publications

References 2 publications

Exchange rates and risk premia within the European Monetary System

Exchange rates and risk premia within the European Monetary System

The political cost of taxation: New evidence from German popularity ratings

On Inflation Targeting in the United Kingdom

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About