Interest Rate Movement in the United States, 1888–1913

Smiley, Gene

doi:10.1017/s0022050700075653

Cited by 39 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Typically, the National Bank data has been used to compute regional bank lending rates. Major contributions include Lance Davis (1965), Richard Sylla (1969), Gene Smiley (1975), and John James (1976). The most recent, and in our view, best data now available are the estimates prepared by Scott A. .…”

Section: Our Bank "Stress Test"mentioning

confidence: 99%

Droughts, Floods, and Financial Distress in the United States

Landon‐Lane¹,

Rockoff²,

Steckel³

2011

The Economics of Climate Change

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The authors thank conference participants, David Stahle and Henri Grissino-Mayer for comments and suggestions. We also thank Scott A. Redenius who was kind enough to share his estimates of the rates of return to bank equity. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peerreviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.

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Section: Our Bank "Stress Test"mentioning

confidence: 99%

Droughts, Floods, and Financial Distress in the United States

Landon‐Lane¹,

Rockoff²,

Steckel³

2011

The Economics of Climate Change

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“…Breckenridge (1898), which is still well worth reading. More recent contributions, just to mention a few of our favorites, include Richard Sylla (1967, 1969, John James (November 1976, December 1976, Gene Smiley (1975), Richard Keehn (1980), and (of course!) Howard Bodenhorn and Hugh Rockoff (1992).…”

Section: Financial Integration In a Monetary Unionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Bodenhorn (1992) and Bodenhorn and Rockoff (1992) explored integration before the Civil War. Gene Smiley (1975) also modified Davis's interest rate estimates, and raised an interesting point about the measurement of interest rate differentials: should we look at absolute differentials or a measure of dispersion such as the coefficient of variation. Since interest rates were generally falling at the end of the nineteenth century (in the United States and the rest of the world) absolute differentials were falling.…”

Section: The Debate Over Financial Market Integrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The United States returned to the gold standard in 1879, so Bodenhorn's data starts when the U.S. monetary union is reconstituted after the Civil War. Bodenhorn (1995), following Smiley (1975) and James (December 1976, November 1976, purged Davis's data of various revenues and losses in order to arrive at something closer to contractual loan rates. Essentially, Davis attributed all bank earnings to loans, and divided that figure by total loans to get a proxy for the rate of interest.…”

Section: Data and Definitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Monetary Policy and Regional Interest Rates in the United States, 1880-2002

Landon‐Lane¹,

Rockoff²

2004

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The long running debate among economic historians over how long it took regional financial markets in the United States to become fully integrated should be of considerable interest to students of monetary unions. This paper reviews the debate, discusses the implications of various hypotheses for the optimality of the US monetary union, and presents some new findings on the origin and diffusion of monetary shocks. It appears that financial markets were integrated in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the sense that monetary shocks were routinely transmitted from one part of the United States to another. In particular, shocks to interest rates in the eastern financial centers were routinely transmitted to the periphery. However, it also appears that during this period significant shocks to bank lending rates in the periphery often arose on the periphery itself. This suggests that a nineteenth century monetary authority that relied on operations confined to eastern financial centers would have had a difficult time managing the U.S. monetary union. After World War II the problem of eruptions on the periphery declined.

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“…ECB (2007), especially pp.24-5, provides an analysis of country differences in bank interest rates that is most directly comparable to the historical evidence discussed here. 45 As emphasized by Smiley (1975) and Eichengreen (1994). 46 As emphasized by Sylla (1969). market.…”

mentioning

confidence: 96%

Sui Generis EMU

Eichengreen¹

2008

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The thesis of this paper is that there is no historical precedent for Europe's monetary union (EMU). While it is possible to point to similar historical experiences, the most obvious of which were in the 19th century, occurred in Europe, and had "union" as part of their names, EMU differs from these earlier monetary unions. The closer one looks the more uncomfortable one becomes with the effort to draw parallels on the basis of historical experience. It is argued that efforts to draw parallels between EMU and monetary unions past are more likely to mislead than to offer useful insights. Where history is useful is not in drawing parallels but in pinpointing differences. It is useful for highlighting what is distinctive about EMU.

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Interest Rate Movement in the United States, 1888–1913

Cited by 39 publications

References 6 publications

Droughts, Floods, and Financial Distress in the United States

Droughts, Floods, and Financial Distress in the United States

Monetary Policy and Regional Interest Rates in the United States, 1880-2002

Sui Generis EMU

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