2013
DOI: 10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.06.001
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Interest (mis)alignments in representative negotiations: Do pro-social agents fuel or reduce inter-group conflict?

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Cited by 37 publications
(37 citation statements)
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“…This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. more parochial cooperation than universal cooperation (Aaldering, Greer, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2013;Abbink, Brandts, Hermann, & Orzen, 2012;De Dreu, 2010;De Dreu et al, 2010; also see Polzer, 2004). Importantly, however, according to SIT we should see this tendency toward increased parochial cooperation among prosocials especially in the NSD-IPD and less in the NSD, where parochial cooperation can do little to differentiate the ingroup from the out-group.…”
Section: Social Value Orientation and Parochial Cooperationmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. more parochial cooperation than universal cooperation (Aaldering, Greer, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2013;Abbink, Brandts, Hermann, & Orzen, 2012;De Dreu, 2010;De Dreu et al, 2010; also see Polzer, 2004). Importantly, however, according to SIT we should see this tendency toward increased parochial cooperation among prosocials especially in the NSD-IPD and less in the NSD, where parochial cooperation can do little to differentiate the ingroup from the out-group.…”
Section: Social Value Orientation and Parochial Cooperationmentioning
confidence: 95%
“…requires the in-group to invest more than competing groups, leaving all in-group members better off in case of success. Investments in intergroup conflict for the benefit of the in-group or to hurt the out-group at one's own cost (e.g., parochial altruism [Bernhard et al 2006]) may depend on SVO (Aaldering et al 2013; but see Thielmann & Böhm 2016). Among individuals who chronically disregard or discount their own outcomes and assign positive value to in-group or negative value to out-group outcomes, self-sacrifice could be understood as a rational (yet extreme) tool for resolving intergroup conflict.…”
Section: Extreme Self-sacrifice Reflects a Basic Cognitive Biasmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Second, we examined whether parochial altruism is stronger among individuals who value fairness and cooperation (henceforth “pro-socials,” Van Lange, 1999 ), compared to those who value personal outcomes, and relative gain (henceforth “pro-selfs”). While evolutionary perspectives on parochial altruism are silent about the possibility that individual differences in value orientation impacts parochial altruism, several studies indicate that in intergroup competition, pro-social individuals display stronger parochial altruism, and a desire to benefit the in-group in particular, than pro-selfs ( De Dreu, 2010 ; De Dreu et al, 2010 ; Abbink et al, 2012 ; Aaldering et al, 2013 ). We expected to replicate this finding, and explored whether cognitive taxation interacts with social value orientation in driving parochial altruism.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%