Interdependence and power: a conceptual analysis

Baldwin, David A.

doi:10.1017/s0020818300018828

Cited by 195 publications

(78 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…Ainsi, le pouvoir du secrétariat de l'UNESCO est d'ordre relationnel et, de ce fait, ses attributs n'ont, en euxmêmes, aucun sens. Pour se traduire en influence et capacité d'action, le secrétariat les exerce en s'appuyant sur les ressources asymétriques que les structures d'un contexte d'action mettent à sa disposition (Baldwin, 1980 : consultées pour ce travail sont : les sources primaires écrites, les sources primaires orales (entretiens) et les sources secondaires (analyses menées par d'autres chercheurs). 497 ; Friedberg, 1993 : 124).…”

Section: Université Du Québec à Montréal Et Université Libre De Bruxeunclassified

L’UNESCO face à l’enjeu « commerce-culture »

Vlassis

2014

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Le présent article tente de saisir l’action politique du secrétariat de l’UNESCO vis-à-vis de la gestion de l’interface entre le commerce et la culture, ainsi que ses marges de manoeuvre face aux entrepreneurs de la diversité des expressions culturelles. Alors que la plupart des études relatives à cet enjeu supposent que le secrétariat général reste largement favorable au processus de l’élaboration et de la mise en oeuvre de la Convention sur la diversité culturelle, nous nous interrogeons ici sur les conditions – empiriquement sondées – qui permettent au secrétariat d’agir. Notre analyse démonte alors l’idée courante selon laquelle l’UNESCO était à l’avant-garde de la Convention et illustre les raisons pour lesquelles l’organisation a adopté une position conservatrice sur cette question et a mis en oeuvre un certain nombre de stratégies qui tiennent compte de logiques institutionnelles propres à l’UNESCO.

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Section: Université Du Québec à Montréal Et Université Libre De Bruxeunclassified

L’UNESCO face à l’enjeu « commerce-culture »

Vlassis

2014

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“…The first is the economist's view, the second is that of International Relations Theory (Baldwin, 1980;Wallace, 1986). In the latter, the notion of interdependence has been applied to capture the concept of import vulnerability.…”

Section: Security-dependence Model (Dependence)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Conditions of intergovernmental armaments cooperation in Western Europe, 1996–2006

Thiem

2011

Eur. Pol. Sci. Rev.

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Defence cooperation between Western European countries has increased considerably since the end of the Cold War. An analytical distinction can be made between political and economic cooperation, the latter having been neglected by political scientists. This study advances the debate on economic cooperation by identifying sources of variation in the European Union (EU)-15 countries’ membership rate in cooperative armamentsforaaimed at restructuring the demand side of European defence from 1996 to 2006. By combining six models from three different schools of thought, the risk of confirmation bias through intra-paradigmatic reasoning is reduced. At the same time, fuzzy-set analysis opens up the space for data-driven combination effects. Two distinct combinations form sufficient paths leading to high rates of membership. Most importantly, intentions to create collective defence technological and industrial benefits combine with trust in partners’ ability and integrity to form an essential combination of conditions for governments to pursue cooperation on armaments.

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“…Hirschman 1945. See also Baldwin 1980. noticed fraction of the U.S. economy-meaning that Japan's dependence on the U.S. market exceeded the inverse by factors ranging from 6.3 to 8.7. By the 1990s, however, U.S. exports to Japan had grown to around 0.7 percent of the U.S. economy, and the ratio of Japan's dependence to that of the United States had shrunk to around 3.3:1.…”

Section: Alternative Materialist Explanationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Social Context in Coercive International Bargaining

Schoppa¹

1999

Int Org

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Although international relations scholarship emphasizing the role of social constructs such as norms and culture has established a beachhead in the area of security studies, 1 it has yet to take on another bastion of the rational materialist approach: studies of coercive international bargaining. Scholarship in this area, ranging from the work of Thomas Schelling to James Fearon, has long argued that bargaining outcomes re ect the material costs and bene ts faced by participants in negotiations. 2 Participants can in uence outcomes, these models assume, only through tactics such as credible threats and side payments that reshape the material context of negotiations.The assumption of rational materialism has been entrenched in the study of coercive international bargaining for the same reason it was widely adopted in the area of security studies: because international relations scholars in both areas have bought into the view that the anarchic nature of the international system forces nations to operate in a self-help world: trust no one and concentrate on the all-important aim of maintaining your security by maximizing your own relative power. Given this starting point, studies of coercive international bargaining have naturally focused on the concrete, material context of negotiations: the overall power resources of each side,

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Interdependence and power: a conceptual analysis

Cited by 195 publications

References 37 publications

L’UNESCO face à l’enjeu « commerce-culture »

L’UNESCO face à l’enjeu « commerce-culture »

Conditions of intergovernmental armaments cooperation in Western Europe, 1996–2006

The Social Context in Coercive International Bargaining

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