Interactions between hard and soft power: The institutional adaptation of international intellectual property protection to global power shifts

Abstract

Prevailing power transition theories focus on hard sources of power to explain why international institutions do, or do not, adapt to shifts in the balance of power among their members. This article argues that, in the wake of such a shift in the balance between emerging and established powers, institutional adaptations depend on both their hard and soft power resources. Soft power matters for institutional adaptations because both emerging and established powers have to justify the use of hard power to their respective audiences. Whether emerging or established powers are able to use the hard power they have depends crucially on rhetorical resources, such as claims of legitimacy and their (transnational) societal resonance. We provide empirical support for our argument through an analysis of the adaptation of the Trade-Related Aspects of International Property Rights agreement and the adaptation of the Convention on Biological Diversity. Emerging powers such as Brazil, India and South Africa were able to bring about institutional adaptations because they not only had the hard power to undermine the respective institutions, but could also build on civil society support that legitimized their demands or constrained established states’ use of hard power to fend off their demands.

The Adjustment of International Institutions to Global Power Shifts: A Framework for Analysis

“…Primarily, however, challengers argue not in order to convince the defenders, but to inflict hypocrisy costs on them by highlighting disparities between the defenders' professed commitment to normative or causal beliefs and their actual behavior (Goddard, this issue). They use accusatory speech acts, especially shaming to try to compel defenders to accept institutional adjustments (Daßler et al, 2019). When they engage in rhetorical coercion, challengers often have particularly strong incentives to bring in, and mobilize support from, interested third parties such as global civil society activists and their transnational 'advocacy networks' (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), the bureaucracies of international organizations or members of the international community of states and their diplomatic channels.…”

“…When challengers of the institutional status quo engage in rhetorical coercion, their hard power resources are obviously much less important than their soft power (Daßler et al, 2019;Krebs and Jackson, 2007;Schimmelfennig, 2001). The prospects for institutional adjustment through rhetorical coercion depend on whether challengers' arguments against the legitimacy of the institutional status quo are able to mobilize critical audiences.…”

“…In our analysis of challengers' strategies designed to achieve institutional adjustments, we also go beyond the focus of traditional PT theories on the global order as such (Gilpin, 1981;Modelski, 1987;Organski, 1968). Again we follow more recent PST contributions instead, which study the adjustment of issue-area-specific institutions such as the UNSC, WTO or IMF that underpin the international order (Daßler et al, 2019;Hopewell, 2015;Lesage and van de Graaf, 2015;Schirm, 2010;Zangl et al, 2016). By institutional adaptation or institutional adjustmentwe use these terms interchangeablywe mean reforms to institutions that are agreed between challengers and defenders of the institutional status quo and that reduce the power mismatch between the issue-area-specific global distribution of power and the status quo that prompted challengers to demand institutional change in the first place.…”

Whither soft power? Divisions, milestones, and prospects of a research programme in the making

“…In her reading of soft power Feklyunina asserts that 'we cannot attribute any individual foreign policy decision of the second actor to the exercise of soft power by the first actor' (Feklyunina 2016, p. 778). Daßler and his collaborators, on the other hand, seek to refute this argument by investigating the interaction of soft-and hard-power effects in the domain of institutional adaptations in world politics (Daßler et al 2018).…”

“…Furthermore, the diffusion of soft-power ownership between the government and civil society is commonly recognised by scholars in the field(Fan 2008;Roselle et al 2014). As regards the mechanisms of soft power, some authors(Daßler et al 2018;Gallarotti 2011;Kroenig et al 2010;Roselle et al 2014;…”